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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the function of national identity and the degree to which it is a
recent development, particularly in the region of the Balkan Peninsula populated by the South
Slav (Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian) peoples. The study examines the question of whether in the
period prior to 1918, when much of this territory was part of the multinational empire of AustriaHungary, was it possible for individuals to be entirely loyal to both their national group and to
the construct of the multinational state simultaneously.
In order to answer this question, the dissertation surveys the career of Svetozar Boroević von
Bojna (1856-1920), a high-ranking officer with the Habsburg Monarchy’s armed forces who was
of Serb-Croatian ethnicity. The dissertation examines each stage of his career and his commands
during the First World War, the Eastern (Carpathian) Front, and the Isonzo Front, as well as his
fate following the war, and demonstrates how the issue of nationality and national identity
impacted Boroevic’s relationship with the ruling classes of the Monarchy as well as others of
South Slav nationality. A concluding section challenges the prevailing narrative about the
success of the nationalization project among the South Slav peoples at the end of the First World
War, and concurs with other recent scholarship about national identification among other groups
of the Habsburg Monarchy.
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INTRODUCTION

But special praise should be given
To General Boroević, the Commandant
Who so courageously led the troops
And directed them with a secure hand 1

Taken together, the wars originating in the Balkan Peninsula at the beginning and the end of
the twentieth century appeared to signal the ultimate verdict on the viability of the multinational
state as a political construct. From a standpoint of assuring peaceful, “modern” development, the
ideal state construct, one might understandably argue, is for each individual ethnic group to
comprise its own (preferably independent) nation-state. Paradoxically, however, nationalism and
the expression of national identity have been regarded as very recent developments; save for
outliers such as Philip Gorski, the majority opinion of scholars on the national issue (e.g.,
historians and sociologists, as demonstrated by the works of Benedict Anderson and Ernest
Gellner among others) places the genesis of nationalism as a driving force in European society to
the late eighteenth century at the earliest. 2 Since that time, according to the conventional

1

“Den Helden an der Isonzofront,” Anonymous and undated. Nachlass Boroevic, v. 17. See the
Historiography section of this chapter for a discussion of the use of the materials from
Boroević’s Nachlass and other archival materials.
2
Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Benedict
Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism
(London: Verso, 2006); Philip S. Gorski, “The Mosaic Moment: An Early Modernist Critique of
1

narrative, the population of Central and Eastern Europe has been drawn inexorably toward
identification with one national classification or another, and to press for increased political
rights for their ethnic group. But what are we to make of expressions of loyalty to the
multinational states these national movements sought to replace, or expressions of nostalgia for
the old empires in the years after 1918? Are such sentiments aberrant, or are they in fact closer to
the cultural mainstream than many nationalist observers would admit? Notwithstanding the
allure for many of separate national states, is it possible to identify with a particular ethnic group
and still profess loyalty to a multinational construct (as the people of Scotland did in 2014 when
voting down the proposal for independence from the United Kingdom)? Is it even possible in a
supposedly nationally charged atmosphere to not associate with a nationality at all? A crucial
component of this question concerns the ultimate “arbiter” of national identity. Who decides
what national group one “should” be associated with – the individual or the community? As
historians and sociologists review the balance sheet of positive and negative outcomes of
nationalist movements from the 19th century onward (i.e., the promised cultural development
within national states vs. ethnic violence occurring in disputed “national” territory), the question
remains to what degree the nationalist program permeated the consciousness of society beyond
the bounds of the intelligentsia, in Europe or elsewhere. My dissertation will concern these issues
of nationality and national indifference on the individual (or micro) level, specifically as it
relates to the South Slav territories of Southeastern Europe.
The career of Svetozar Boroević von Bojna is illustrative of the operation of national identity
within the context of the collapse of a multinational state. Boroević (1856-1920) rendered

Modernist Theories of Nationalism,” American Journal of Sociology (Vol. 105, No. 5, March
2000), pp. 1428-68.
2

lifelong service to the army of Austria-Hungary, achieving the Austro-Hungarian army’s highest
rank (Feldmarschall, field marshal – roughly equivalent to a U.S. Army Five Star General) and
ultimately the command of the army group fighting on the Isonzo Front during the First World
War. By all accounts, Boroević identified proudly with his homeland of Croatia (although
sources differ as to whether he identified personally as a Croat or Serb, as will be discussed), yet
he remained kaisertreu (loyal to the emperor and empire) until the very end of the AustroHungarian state. This same loyalty was to prove his undoing in the wake of the collapse of the
Dual Monarchy, as his association with the state led, in part, to the decision by the government
of the new Yugoslav state to refuse Boroević citizenship in his own home. Though granted
refuge by the new “Republic of German Austria,” the highly unstable political and economic
climate of the immediate postwar years led to the inability of Boroević to even collect the
pension that was his due as a veteran officer of the Austro-Hungarian army, and it was his fate to
die in poverty living in Klagenfurt (in Carinthia, southern Austria) in 1920.
The story of Boroević’s career and ultimate fate is intimately connected to the rise and
resolution of the nationality question in the Balkans during the nineteenth century and the first
decades of the twentieth century. The period of Boroević’s career mirrored perhaps the most
intense period of developing national identity throughout the Monarchy, especially in its Balkan
provinces, and he unwittingly (and unwillingly) became a figure to be used both by centralizing
and nationalizing forces, as this study will outline. In addition, the issues of nationalism and
kaisertreu sentiment in this region take on a particular poignancy with respect to the legacy of
the Habsburg imperial institution known as the Croatian Military Frontier, which directly
impacted Boroević’s family. The Military Frontier, as the border between the lands of the
Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire, had a unique constitutional status, and the

3

inhabitants of the Frontier, or Grenzer, enjoyed both special privileges and an identity that set
them apart from other subjects of the Habsburg Emperor, and even from their fellow Serbs and
Croats living just north of the Frontier in Croatia proper. 3 I will examine closely the culture of
the Grenzer and its role in shaping Boroević in the first chapter of this study.
The character of Svetozar Boroević in many ways breaks the mold of the narrative of national
identification. On the one hand, he was tied inextricably to the ostensibly supranational culture of
the officer corps of the Habsburg Monarchy, and served his imperial and royal master loyally in
multiple postings over a long career. On the other hand, he professed deep loyalty to his
homeland in the Croatian lands of the Kingdom of Hungary, leading at least one biographer to
identify a fervent ambition on Boroević’s part to one day be named as Ban (governor) of
Croatia.4 In a context in which loyalty to the state and loyalty to one’s national group are not
necessarily one and the same, is it possible to profess true loyalty to both? Increasingly during
the opening years of the twentieth century, nationalist leaders such as Tomas Masaryk and Ante
Trumbić began to answer that question in the negative. The experience of Boroević, on the other
hand, appears to present a counter example.
What serves as the marker of nationality? The answer to this question, of course, varies from
case to case; however, generally a common language and cultural institutions are considered the
minimum criteria. In the case of the Yugoslav national groups, of course, religion has also served
as a form of national distinction, with Serbian and Croatian populations generally being
distinguished by their adherence to, respectively, Eastern Orthodoxy or Roman Catholicism. If

3

Gunther Rothenberg, The Military Border in Croatia, 1740-1881: A Study of an Imperial
Institution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).
4
Eduard Hoffmann, Feldmarschall Svetozar Boroevic von Bojna, PhD Diss. (University of
Vienna, 1985), p. 18.
4

this is the case, how then are we to account for the fact that multiple works on Boroević and the
Isonzo front have been inconsistent in this regard? Some have identified him as a Croat, others as
a Croatian Serb.5 Boroević himself came from an Orthodox family, which, in view of the
currently accepted ethnic demarcation (Orthodox=Serb, Catholic=Croat), would make him
Serbian.6 However, there is also the question of the different alphabets used; Cyrillic normally
used by Serbs, Latin normally used by Croats. While Boroević was almost certainly familiar with
Cyrillic, most of his correspondence was written in the Latin alphabet. 7 What then, is the reason
for the discrepancy? This question will be explored in depth in the first chapter of this study.
From 1918 until fairly recently, the study of the construct of the multinational state has
focused squarely on the centrifugal forces driving apart the different constituent components of
the state.8 In recent years, however, a body of literature has appeared to counterbalance this
narrative, demonstrating instead expressions of loyalty to the status quo, and examining attempts
at nationalizing subject populations that were met with indifference or even outright hostility.
This more recent literature calls into question the presumed “inevitability” of the nationalization
of the population of Central and Eastern Europe. For example, Jeremy King’s Budweisers into
Czechs and Germans and Tara Zahra’s Kidnapped Souls both examine the efforts of competing
Czech and German nationalist organizations to pressure the local population to identify as Czech
or German, and the unexpected resistance they encountered from locals who saw no need to

5

For example, Rudolf Kiszling, (Die Kroaten: Der Schicksalsweg eines Südslawenvolkes (Graz:
Hermann Böhlaus, 1956) identifies Boroevic as Croatian, while Gaetano Cavallaro (Disaster
Ending in Final Victory: The Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Bloomington, IN:
Xlibris, 2010) refers to him as “the Serb.”
6
Hoffmann, Feldmarschall, p. 11.
7
For example, Nachlass Boroevic, v. 18
8
See, for example, Oscar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1929); Robert Kann, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and
National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1848-1918 (New York: Octagon Books, 1950).
5

identify.9 Similar trends have been identified elsewhere in the Monarchy (which will be
examined in detail in Chapter 1) although the South Slav provinces have been the subject of
comparatively less study in this regard. 10
In conjunction with the reappraisal of the supposed inevitability of the nationalization and the
collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy, recent literature has supported the view that the
multinational state was not only a useful construct, but a necessary political, cultural and
economic arrangement at least into the early years of the twentieth century. King and Zahra,
among others, would agree with the sentiment expressed in the Czech author Frantisek Palacky’s
famous dictum, “Truly, if the Austrian Empire had not already existed for a long time, the
interests of Europe and the interests of humanity would demand its speedy creation.” 11 The
Austrian state, in addition to serving as a bulwark against Russian Panslavic expansionism (an
outcome feared by many of the Monarchy’s Czechs and Poles) also served vital economic
functions for Central and Eastern Europe. The state as a whole functioned well as a single
economic unit, with more industrialized areas (such as Bohemia) supporting (and being
supported by) more agrarian ones (such as eastern Hungary or Galicia). Philip Longworth, in his
monograph survey of Eastern Europe, has argued that the consequences of breaking up this unit
into separate states were disastrous, contributing to the economic crises in the successor states
(and Central Europe as a whole) during the interwar period. 12 This economic angle is especially

9

Jeremy King, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2002); Tara Zahra, Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the
Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).
10
However, Pieter Judson’s Guardians of the Nation: Activists of the Language Frontiers of
Imperial Austria (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006) does consider the case of the
nationalization projects in the Slovene-populated territories of the Monarchy.
11
Kann, Multinational Empire, v.2, p. 137.
12
Philip Longworth, The Making of Eastern Europe (London: Macmillan Press 1992), pp. 69-71.
6

relevant to the study of the multinational state as a construct, as the argument can easily be made
that a key reason for the survival of several modern day multinational states (such as the United
Kingdom and Canada) lies in the perception that the economic benefits of remaining within the
union are sufficient incentive for the population to resist the siren call of national secessionist
movements.13
My argument in the present study is twofold: First, I posit that national identification within
the South Slav territories was a much more fluid category in the years prior to 1914 than it has
proven to be since. Further, I argue that, under the construct of the multinational state, multiple
national identities were much closer to the norm than nationalist literature, specifically with
regard to the South Slav areas, has generally accounted for.
Possessing multiple national identities in some respects is not particularly unusual. In the
United States, we might hear someone say “I’m an American of Italian ancestry,” while citizens
of the United Kingdom, depending on the circumstance, might feel the need to specify that they
are British and Scottish. This sort of dynamic, however, has traditionally been much less often
observed in the lands of Central and Eastern Europe. Less often observed, but not by any means
absent; I will discuss that not only was it not unusual for individuals like Boroević to claim both
a national and multinational identity, but also that this was an outcome that was actively
encouraged by the state system of the Habsburg Monarchy, even if this was a system that, in the
view of Robert Kann and others, proved to be ineffectual in resolving the nationality problem. 14

13

For example, Michael Keating, “Stateless Nation-Building: Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland in
the Changing State System,” Nations and Nationalism (Vol. 3, No. 4, 1997), makes the argument
that this economic incentive was a primary reason for the failure of the 1995 Quebec
independence referendum.
14
Kann, Multinational Empire, v. 2, pp. 286-298.
7

Moreover, the literature on nationalism bears out this supposition. For example, Rogers
Brubaker, in his 1992 study Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, identified two
distinct types of nationalism: civic nationalism, in which national identification and belonging
are primary demonstrated through adherence to the community (or state) and its institutions, and
ethnic nationalism, in which national identity is determined primarily (in some cases exclusively)
by ancestry.15 Although in some societies the two have been mutually exclusive (Brubaker uses
the example of ethnic nationalism in Germany) this is not necessarily the case. For example, it is
not difficult to witness the operation of both civic and ethnic nationalism in the modern-day
United States.
Nor is this concept of dual nationalism unheard of even in the context of Eastern Europe.
Around the same time, the government of the Ottoman Empire, following the 1908 Young Turk
Revolution, attempted to shore up its hold on its remaining non-Turkish provinces by
encouraging the ethic of “civic Ottomanism” among its population. Under this paradigm, all of
the subjects of the sultan were encouraged to become equal and participatory citizens in the
Ottoman state, while still culturally remaining part of their own national community. In this case,
there was to be no contradiction in being an Ottoman Jew or an Ottoman Arab (in effect, a
reinforcement of Brubaker’s paradigm).16 The imperial court in Vienna certainly saw the value in
encouraging a similar dynamic, and the present study will examine some of the ways in which
this civic nationalism was instilled in the population of the Monarchy. One area in which this

15

Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1992).
16
Michelle Campos, Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth
Century Palestine (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011) provides a thorough
examination of the concept of civic Ottomanism, demonstrating how it served to at least partially
sublimate ethnic tensions between Jewish and Arab populations in the province of Palestine.
8

supranational project experienced its greatest success is in the culture of the joint AustroHungarian army, specifically the officer corps - a world in which Boroević himself was entirely
immersed.17
Even in places where multiple national identities coexist, as in the United States, the open
display of such multiple identities can be problematic. As evidence, one need look no further
than media reports of certain aspects of the culture wars in contemporary America. Those
seeking greater accommodation of their language and culture (such as those of Hispanic or
Latino descent) face pushback from those who believe that in order to be a “true American,” one
must speak English and more fully assimilate to a larger American culture. Displays of identity
outside of these prescribed bounds are regarded by the latter group as “un-American” and
suspect. As I will outline later in this study, a similar hostility toward multiculturalism and
divided identity began to prevail in the South Slav areas in the opening years of the twentieth
century, especially in the years following 1918. It is important to note, however, that prior to the
ascendance of this nationalist narrative, such exclusionary national identification was not the
norm in Eastern Europe, and it is becoming less of the norm even today, as populations in
Central and Eastern Europe, under the aegis of the European Union, begin to further embrace
multiculturalism again.
The concept of the nation and the processes of national identification have been the subject of
a substantial body of literature produced by historians, sociologists and political scientists.
Among the most poignant for our purposes is Benedict Anderson’s groundbreaking study

17

István Deák, Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer
Corps, 1848-1918 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) provides a thorough survey of the
culture of the officer corps, including an examination of the how the national question figured
into officer training and command posts.
9

Imagined Communities. As its title implies, Anderson views the nation as, essentially, an
imagined construct, one that has only as much meaning as its adherents ascribe to it, unsupported
by concrete structures.18 Anderson makes a point especially salient for our purposes, that once
the idea of the nation has been created, it becomes “capable of being transplanted, with varying
degrees of self-consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a
correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations.” 19 In effect, the
nationalist narrative can not only be made to serve multiple functions within society, it can serve
as the primary determinant of “who belongs,” sublimating others; this is the process that played
out in the South Slav areas after 1918, and then during the late 1980s and 1990s.
Although much of the scholarship comes squarely on the side of the nation being a modern
phenomenon, having its origins during the period of the French Revolution at the earliest, there
have been a few naysayers. Norman Davies has argued for distinctive “national” cultural
institutions that can be identified even during the medieval period. 20 Serhii Plokhy, in his study
of formation of national identity in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, argues that the nationalization
process began with the Christianization of the Kievan Rus during the tenth century, and was
completed by the reign of Peter the Great during the early eighteenth century. 21
It is Philip Gorski’s dissenting voice on this question, however, which provides the most
interesting insight for the South Slav region. Gorski has argued that a form of national identity
could be observed as far back as the sixteenth century. As evidence he uses the Dutch revolt
against Spanish rule, in which religion played a crucial role in identification, particularly with

18

Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6.
Ibid, 4.
20
Norman Davies, Europe: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
21
Serhii Plokhy, The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine,
and Belarus (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
19

10

regard to “the Other.” In effect, Calvinist Protestantism became the primary determinant of
Dutch national identity, distinguishing them from both the foreign Spanish and their fellow
Netherlanders who continued to adhere to Catholicism. 22 The parallels with the South Slav case
are readily apparent; we can see that, at least according to Gorski, the use of religion as the
primary marker of ethnicity is not unique to the Serbs and Croats.
Though Gorski presents a valid point on the national issue, in general terms, the expression of
national identity as we currently recognize it is a distinctly modern phenomenon. It is true that,
particularly in this region, nationalists have grasped upon a heroic past and placed it into service
to demonstrate the ancient status of their group (and its attendant claims on territory and
loyalties); just one example is the use of the memory of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo in Serbian
national discourse.23 However, these are merely modern appropriations of events that in previous
eras carried far less significance. Far from shedding light on historical national identification,
such appropriations have served to complicate more recent historiography in the region, as I will
discuss shortly in the section on historiography.
Ernest Gellner, in his 1983 study Nations and Nationalism, argues that a certain level of
cultural development, nearly reaching industrialization, is necessary for the full development of
national consciousness. The South Slav case appears to bear out this argument; the major efforts
by Serbian and Croatian nationalists had their origins no earlier than the first part of the 19 th
century; and it was not to be until the beginning of the 20th century that such efforts were to take

22

Gorski, “The Mosaic Moment.”
For the use of the memory of Kosovo by Serbian nationalists and demagogues, see Katherine
Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change (New York:
Columbia University Press 1999).
23
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root. Moreover, nationalist literature was to be the preserve of a small educated group of middleand-upper-class intelligentsia; the rise of such a class was enabled by the achievement of a level
of development in line with Gellner’s paradigm.
A key concept to take into account in any examination of the nationality issue in the area of
the Habsburg Monarchy and its successor states is that of Heimat. This concept conveys a layer
of meaning deeper than its literal translation – “homeland.” Throughout the present study, I will
closely examine the operation of the concept of Heimat, with specific emphasis on the
connections between individuals and their communities (both national and physical), and the
state’s role in determining and enforcing these connections. The question of Heimat took on an
even greater significance after 1918, as each of the successor states grappled with issues of
citizenship for those who found themselves, willingly or not, within their borders. Although
Heimatrecht (“right of domicile”) was generally limited to citizens of German ethnicity after
1918, a number of non-ethnic Germans (including Boroević) benefited from a clause in the
Treaty of Saint-Germain which allowed residence in postwar Austria to refugees from elsewhere
in the former Monarchy.24 I will give specific attention to the operation of Heimat in the Austrian
Republic, as the complexities of the law (especially with regard to non-ethnic Germans) directly
impacted Boroević’s final years.
The objection can be raised that Boroević’s experience as a member of the Austro-Hungarian
officer corps places him in the ranks of the elite of Habsburg society, and thus his experience is

24

Edward Timms, “Citizenship and ‘Heimatrecht’ After the Treaty of Saint-Germain,” pp. 158168 in Richie Robertson and Edward Timms, eds, The Habsburg Legacy: National Identity in
Historical Perspective (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994) examines the concepts of
Heimat and Heimatrecht in the First Austrian Republic.

12

not as informative of the individual citizen’s experience with national identification as one who
stood outside such a privileged class. This is a fair point; it is certainly difficult to argue that a
peasant farmer in Dalmatia or a merchant in Zagreb would necessarily have had similar views on
the national issue. However, the officer corps of the Austro-Hungarian army presents a unique
opportunity to examine a culture in which training and ability counted for more than birth with
respect to advancement. The officer corps was a remarkably egalitarian institution for its time
and place, and represented one of the few avenues by which individuals of common birth could
enter the elites of Habsburg society. As I outline later in this study, officers with some years’
experience were to be granted a noble title, a benefit of which Boroević himself took
advantage.25 It is true that this route of social advancement was not available to just anyone, and
even an officer’s noble title was usually insufficient to gain access to the highest circles of the
aristocracy, but training as an officer, for a great many soldiers, opened doors that would
otherwise have been locked and barred to them. I argue that this was certainly the case for
Boroević, and he advanced much further within the milieu of the Habsburg Monarchy than he
likely would have had he not embarked on a military career. As a result, Boroević’s experience
can still be instructive of how a substantial segment of the population of the Monarchy
responded both the projects of nationalist organizations and the state’s attempts to resolve the
nationality issue (in the process preserving the Monarchy) themselves.

25

Deak, Beyond Nationalism, 158.
13

Historiography
There is a vast body of literature, in both English and German, regarding the Habsburg
Monarchy and its participation in the First World War. In this section I will discuss just the key
major sources contributing to the present study. A standard starting point has been ÖsterreichUngarns Letzter Krieg (“Austria-Hungary's Last War”), a multivolume work produced by
members of the Austrian government during the interwar period, serving as the "official" account
of the war. Although far from unbiased, this work forms a basis for Austrian historiography of
the war and its soldiers. With regard to the nationality question in the Monarchy, Robert Kann’s
1950 study The Multinational Empire is one of the standards in the field; many authors since
have endeavored to expand, confirm, or counter his arguments. Another key resource is the
encyclopedic edited collection Die Habsburgermonarchie (The Habsburg Monarchy), a
multivolume work (at the present writing comprising 10 volumes) published by the Austrian
Academy of Sciences, containing expository articles and collections of statistics for virtually all
facets of society for the Austro-Hungarian state from 1848 until 1918.
With regards to the South Slav territories, recent historiography has been considerably
clouded by the legacy of the wars accompanying the collapse of Yugoslavia during the early
1990s; as a result, many of the historical works on the region during the 1990s were produced
not by historians but by journalists who had been involved in reporting on the war zones.
Although works by Misha Glenny and Marcus Tanner are well researched and generally solid
with regard to recent history, they still fall into the trap of taking some elements of the national
narratives espoused by contemporary Serbian and Croatian leaders at face value. 26 In a similar
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manner, at the same time, Robert Kaplan’s book Balkan Ghosts, which erroneously ascribed the
conflict between Serbs and Croats to “ancient hatreds” spread an idea that influenced not only
subsequent historiography of the two peoples but also the response of Western powers
(particularly the United States and United Kingdom) to the violence in dissolving Yugoslavia. 27
Serious historiography, however, has consistently supported the notion that this idea of “ancient
hatreds” is a gross mischaracterization; up until the early twentieth century, relations between
Serbs and Croats were generally amicable, and representatives of the two groups often worked in
tandem to achieve common goals.28 In fact, the greater part of the animosity between Serbs and
Croats that produced such explosive results began later on, mostly as a result of the events of the
interwar period and the Second World War. It is only relatively recently (i.e., since the early
2000s) that more works on the region have been produced by dedicated scholars. The work of
Sabrina Ramet, among others, serves as a corrective to the 1990s period of observers following
the false trail of “ancient hatreds.” 29
By comparison with the available scholarship on the war, the Habsburg Monarchy, and the
South Slav territories, the volume of secondary source material regarding Boroević specifically
is fairly thin. Most of the material that has been published in English provides information about
Boroević within the context of a larger narrative, such as works on the Habsburg Monarchy and
its military (just one example being Istvan Deak's work) or works on specific engagements
during the First World War (such as John Schindler's excellent monograph study of the war on
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the Isonzo front).30 German language readers are served by two solid biographies of Boroević.
The first, Eduard Hoffmann's 1984 study Feldmarschall Svetozar Boroević von Bojna is an
unpublished doctoral dissertation that examines in great detail how Boroević's command of the
army on the Isonzo contributed to the outcome of the individual engagements. 31 The second,
Ernest Bauer's 1985 book Der Löwe vom Isonzo, is a well-researched popular press work that
provides a wealth of information about Boroević's life; however, its usefulness as a source is
limited due to the lack of source citations in the book. 32
Therefore, in order to round out the picture of Boroević, the present study will rely heavily on
primary source documents, the majority of which are housed within the Austrian State Archive
in Vienna. The voluminous Nachlässe (official papers) of Boroević and several who served
closely with him provide a wealth of insight into the character of Boroević as a soldier and
servant of the state.33 Boroević wrote very little regarding himself; however, his correspondence
provides a window into his views towards the state, his people, and his place within both
constructs. The Nachlass of Anton Pitreich, Boroević's Chief of Staff, goes into detail regarding
Boroević's relationship with the troops under his command, at times shedding light on Boroević
and the nationality question. Karl Schneller, the General Staff officer assigned to the Southwest
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Front (Italy) displays an intense dislike of Boroević, and Schneller’s account (provided in the
War Diary included in his Nachlass) is often critical of him as a commander. Another interesting
viewpoint comes from Rudolf Kiszling, who served in Boroević's army during the war, and in
later years wrote a number of historical monographs, including works on the history of Croatia
and the other South Slav regions. Perhaps not surprisingly, Kiszling’s Nachlass is the most
squarely focused on the national issue. None of these Nachlässe serve to paint a complete picture
of Svetozar Boroević (not even his own); however, each provides a vital piece of the puzzle.
In addition to the Nachlässe, several other sources from the Austrian State Archive will be
utilized. One is the official War Diaries of the 5th Army and the Army Group Isonzo (the larger
army group over which Boroević was given command in 1917). Although this document
provides little information about Boroević and the national issue per se, it provides a great deal
of information about the impact that conditions at the front, and decisions made by Boroević, had
on troop morale. The second are the documents known as the Qualificatsionsliste for Boroević.
These documents, completed periodically for each officer, provide a snapshot of the officer's
career and status at the time of the document. Crucially, the documents contain personal
information about the officer, such as family background, education, commendations,
performance reviews, and languages spoken (however, ironically, not primary language or
ethnicity). The Qualificatsionsliste provide a great resource for dissecting the career of an officer
of the Monarchy, though I agree with Istvan Deak’s proviso that it is often necessary to “read
between the lines” when examining such a source. 34 The Archive contains not only the
Qualificatsionsliste for Svetozar Boroević, but also those for his father Adam and brother
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Nikola, allowing for some pointed personal comparisons and providing additional nuance to the
question of how Boroević’s heritage as a Grenzer influenced his career.
Rounding out my primary source material are a limited number of published primary sources
(such as memoirs and official publications of the Austro-Hungarian governments before and
during the war) and contemporary newspaper articles. Interactions with Boroević figure
prominently in the writings of several individuals who were intimately involved with the war
effort, such as the Austro-Hungarian Chief of the General Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf.
Moreover, as a celebrity even in his day, there exist many newspaper accounts of Boroević in the
Austrian press during the war and in the years afterward. These accounts shed great insight into
the cultivation of the image of Boroević during the war, as well as the interactions with his
memory following his death.
Finally, a word about sources in South Slav languages (i.e., Serbian, Croatian, and
Slovenian). While it would appear that these sources would give a more comprehensive picture
of Svetozar Boroević, and several have been consulted and cited in this study, these have not
been extensively used for several reasons. Access to primary source material regarding Boroević
in these languages (other than what is in his Nachlass) is at this time limited. As I discuss in
Chapter 5, the secondary source literature on Boroević in Croatian and Slovenian is relatively
recent and still emerging. Gaining access to additional primary source material at the Croatian
State Archive in Zagreb would present a fertile ground for future research into a possible
comprehensive biography of Boroević, as mentioned in the next section. However, the relative
paucity of sources of this kind does not represent a major obstacle, as German served as a lingua
franca to a major degree in the Dual Monarchy, and much of the correspondence of the major
players involved in this story was written or translated into German. In addition, a number of
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texts in Croatian and Slovenian are included in Boroević’s Nachlass, occasionally accompanied
by German translation.

Outline of the Work
The first chapter of this study will provide the background on the early life and career of
Boroević. I will examine the major influences on Boroević’s upbringing and career path, in
particular the status of the Dual Monarchy during his formative years, the varying political status
of the Croatian territories and their relationship with the Vienna and Budapest governments, as
well as the institution of the Military Frontier and its considerable influence on Boroević and his
immediate ancestors.
The very polyglot nature of the Habsburg Monarchy in the years after the Ausgleich of 1867
adds a layer of nuance to the question of how one can possess multiple identities and loyalties.
First and foremost, the roles of Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, though held by the
same individual, were distinct, sometimes conflicting, entities; they were not to be used
interchangeably. The two offices were kept separate to the point that, within the lands of the
Kingdom of Hungary, one could face penalties for referring to the monarch as Kaiser (Emperor)
rather than Kiraly (King).35 Such a condition begs the question, within the ranks of the common
army (encompassing both halves of the Dual Monarchy), were soldiers expected to be loyal to
the Kaiser or the Kiraly (or both)? Complicating matters further was the constitutional status of
the Croatian lands. Most of the territory of Croatia lay within the bounds of the Kingdom of
Hungary, with two exceptions: Dalmatia (which was part of the Austrian half of the Monarchy)
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and the Military Frontier (which until 1881 existed as a separate unit directly under
administration of the Emperor and the army). This distinction was crucial; as I have argued in a
previous study, after 1867 the governments of Cisleithanian Austria and the Kingdom of
Hungary pursued very divergent policies toward their national groups, with results that continued
to influence subsequent developments in the successor states after 1918. 36 Moreover, Croatian
nationalists, recalling that their land had once been a separate kingdom, pressed their own
historical claims for the relationship of Hungary and Croatia as the personal union of two distinct
polities; in the aftermath of the greater compromise of 1867, a kind of “subdualism” agreement,
granting very limited autonomy to Croatia, was reached in 1868. This comprehensive picture,
necessary to understand the Austro-Hungarian state and Boroević’s place within it, will be
outlined in detail in Chapter 1.
The second and third chapters will recount the experiences of Boroević from the outbreak of
war in 1914 and the first several years as commander of the army on the Isonzo Front. His
actions during the Carpathian War from the summer of 1914 and the first part of 1915 provide
insight into how the national issue informed his command style, identifying trends which were to
continue after his assignment to the command of the Fifth Army following the Italian declaration
of war on Austria-Hungary. It is during this period that Boroević gained the appellation of the
“Lion of the Isonzo,” and narratives about him began to be presented to the Austro-Hungarian
public for consumption as a heroic example of the defender of the monarchy. 37 One folder in
Boroević’s official Nachlass (in the Austrian State Archive) contains several dozen postcards
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and photos of him that were disseminated in different parts of the Monarchy. 38 I will survey in
depth how this image of Boroević came to be cultivated and put to use in the service of the
multinational state.
In surveying the conditions and the unfolding campaign on the Isonzo front, I will examine in
detail a crucial component of this story, the operation of nationalism on both sides of the conflict
on the Austrian littoral territory. The extent to which the action on the Isonzo served as a national
conflict cannot be overstated, as both the attackers and defenders viewed the territory as their
own; in 1917 the composition of the Austro-Hungarian army on the Isonzo was 60 percent
Slavic.39 While troops of Slovene and Croatian nationality were actively fighting to defend
territories in which their conationals comprised a solid majority of the population (and other
Slavic troops fought in solidarity with them – another significant point I will explore), the Italian
war effort was directed at “redeeming” the very same territories, which they claimed as having
longstanding historical ties to Italian populations.
The fourth chapter will provide an account of the tumultuous events of 1918, and the critical
decisions made by Boroević in the final stages of the war. The shift in the outlook of the
defending army during the summer of 1918 (from the unsuccessful Piave offensive) will be
followed to the ultimate collapse of the Austro-Hungarian war effort during October of that year.
During this period, as the Habsburg Monarchy progressed through what was by now an
irreversible course toward its demise, it is worth noting how those who endeavored to preserve
the Monarchy, most notably Emperor Karl, as well as those who sought to establish separate
national states, such as Ante Trumbić (1864-1938, a Croatian politician who served as one of the

38

Nachlass Boroevic, Kriegsarchiv Wien
Feliks Bister, “Vorwort,” in Isonzofront 1915-1917: Die Kultur des Erinnens, ed. Vincenc
Rajsp (Vienna: Slowenisches Wissenschaftsinstitut, 2010), 7-9: 8.
39

21

coordinators of the Yugoslav National Committee’s exile community from London), each
attempted to enlist Boroević’s aid and coopt his position in the Monarchy and among his fellow
South Slavs (i.e., as the highest ranking South Slav officer in the Austro-Hungarian army and a
figure who would be recognizable from press reports to many Serbs, Croats and Slovenes). This
study will examine Boroević’s relationship with both of these individuals, and his reaction to
attempts to place him into service of one of the two narratives (national or supranational). I will
also provide close examination of the implications of Boroević’s ill-fated attempt to march on
Vienna in an effort to save the Habsburg dynasty. The student of the history of the Habsburg
Monarchy will immediately see the parallels between Boroević’s response to the situation and
that of Field Marshall Josef Radetzky and Croatian Ban Josip Jelacic amid the turmoil of the
1848 Revolutions, right down to Jelacic’s own march on Vienna; the connection was certainly
not lost on Boroević. The implications of the Monarchy being rescued a second time by a
kaisertreu Croatian would have been profound, and open up some interesting counterfactual
speculations. I will examine in detail the reasons why what worked in 1848 could not work in
1918.
The fifth chapter will recount the tale of Boroević’s fate after the war, and the reasons for the
refusal of the new Yugoslav state to accept his services, or even citizenship, in the successor
state. I intend to outline detailed comparisons between the ultimate fate of Boroević and those of
other Habsburg officers, particularly Gregor Edler von Miscevic and Stjepan Sarkotic, two
soldiers who, like Boroević, came from a (Serb-)Croatian Grenzer background, and were loyal to
the state system of the Dual Monarchy (to distinguish this from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats,
and Slovenes). I will provide a brief discussion of the limited attempts to interact with the
memory of Boroević in relation to the national issue in the Yugoslav territories. Although in
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some respects, Boroević, who was claimed for both Serbs and Croats, represented the exemplar
of the “Yugoslav” nationality that the leaders of the post-1918 Yugoslavia attempted, ultimately
unsuccessfully, to foster (as a sort of proto-Tito). For reasons I will discuss in this chapter, the
interwar Yugoslav government declined to take advantage of such an opportunity, and I have
found no evidence of Josip Tito or his successors interacting with the memory of Boroević
during the period after 1945. This does not, however, mean that Boroević had disappeared from
the historical memory of the population of Yugoslavia and its successor states. Finally, a
concluding section will discuss the significance of Boroević’s experience in light of the greater
question of national identification. As even a brief overview of his life and career demonstrates,
Svetozar Boroević defies the tidy narrative of progression from national indifference to exclusive
identification with one’s own ethnic community. The emerging literature on nationalism and
national identification in Central and Eastern Europe tends to support the argument that Boroević
was not sui generis in this regard, but part of what could reasonably termed a “silent majority” of
citizens who either remained indifferent to national identification or professed multiple national
loyalties.
Finally, a word about what this study is not. It is not a comprehensive biography of Svetozar
Boroević. While I believe that such a work would be a worthwhile endeavor, the available source
material, for the present at least, does not give a complete enough picture of Boroević to trace the
full narrative of his life. It is also not, per se, a study of Boroević’s military career. As a member
of the Monarchy’s officer corps and one who spent almost his entire life in uniform, it is true that
Boroević’s military experience was inseparable from his character, and thus cannot be ignored.
However, Eduard Hoffman’s work examines Boroević’s military engagements in great detail,
particularly during the Isonzo campaign, and a work with this focus would be little more than a
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translation of Hoffman’s work. The present study examines Boroević’s command decisions,
particularly as they reflect his character and how they interplay with issues of national identity
during the war.
During a trip to Vienna while conducting research for this study I had the opportunity to visit
Boroević’s resting place at the city’s Central Cemetery (shown in Fig. 1). Looking at his grave I
noticed two interesting things. The first was an inscription on the right-hand corner dedicated to
“The Defenders of the Carpathians and the Isonzo.” (Fig. 3) The second was a wreath at the foot
of the monument, which appeared to have been placed fairly recently, with the words “Croatian
Veterans” (in English) written on the ribbon. I came away with the impression that these two
features speak volumes about the continuing legacy of Svetozar Boroević with regard to his
national identity and his place in the endgame of the state he so loyally served. The image
conveyed is of a soldier committed to the welfare of those under his command, and a patriot
committed to the protection of his homeland and people. How close this image is to the reality of
Boroević’s experience is a topic that will encompass the greater part of this study.
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Fig. 1 Front view of Boroević’s tomb, Vienna Central Cemetery. (Photo taken by author)
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Fig. 2, Side view of Boroević’s tomb, Vienna Central Cemetery. (Photo taken by author)

Fig. 3, Side view of Boroević’s tomb, Vienna Central Cemetery. (Photo taken by author)
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CHAPTER 1
SERVANT OF THE MONARCHY

For a figure who was fated to be a point of national contestation, it is perhaps fitting that even
the birthdate of Svetozar Boroević was expressed in national terms. Some sources, official and
secondary, give his birthdate as December 1, 1856.40 Others give it as December 13, 1856.41
Paradoxically, both dates are actually correct. The reason for this discrepancy is due to the use of
two distinct calendars. According to the Gregorian Calendar, used by Western Europe, the date
was December 13. According to the Julian Calendar, in the process of being phased out but still
in use in Orthodox Eastern Europe during the nineteenth century, the date was December 1. 42 An
argument can be made that the choice of date is in itself a statement of national of the Catholic
monarchy opting for the Gregorian date, while those emphasizing his affiliation as identification,
with those placing emphasis on Boroević’s role as a Croatian and servant a Croatian Serb and
Orthodoxy opting for the Julian one. Boroević himself used the date of December 1. 43
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Sources are much more in agreement in reporting Boroević’s birthplace as Umetic, a small
town currently located in the Republic of Croatia, about 50 miles from Zagreb and close to the
border with Bosnia-Herzegovina.44 At the time of his birth in 1856, the town was located in the
middle of the Croatian Military Frontier.

Grenzerkind
The legacy of the institution known as the Croatian Military Frontier proved decisive in
shaping the upbringing and character of Boroević, as it had for legions of other inhabitants of the
region. Established during the wars with the Ottoman Turks during the sixteenth century, this
area, encompassing a small strip of land approximately 5,000 square miles, served as a fortified
border between the lands of the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire for more than
three centuries. The Frontier (German: die Grenze) was removed from civil authority, and placed
within a sphere of military government directly under the authority of the Kaiser. Within these
territories, it was expected that most able-bodied males were to provide military service to the
Kaiser, especially with regard to protecting the Monarchy against Turkish incursions. This role
as the protectors of the Frontier, the Grenzers, fostered within those serving a sense of identity
that served to distinguish them from their fellow South Slavs (i.e., in civil Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina). This Grenzer identity continued to influence the worldview of their ranks long
after the dissolution of the Military Frontier during the last decades of the nineteenth century; a
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contemporary of Boroević, Gregor Edler von Miscevic, writing shortly before his death in 1937,
identified himself primarily as “ein geborenes Grenzerkind” (a born child of the Frontier).45
In addition to this sense of purpose, the settlers on the Frontier gained a number of tangible
rewards in exchange for their service. Each family unit (zadruga; Serbo-Croatian term meaning
extended family or clan) was granted a small amount of land with a certain degree of autonomy,
including the ability to elect their own leaders, the ability to retain a share in booty plundered
from enemy forces, and freedom from the manorial obligations which were standard for
peasants/farmers in civil Croatia.46 However, the greatest privilege granted to the Grenzer,
especially from Boroević’s standpoint, was that of toleration for the practice of the Orthodox
faith, which was encouraged by the Habsburgs (over the objection of Hungarian and Croatian
authorities, who often pressed for maintaining the supremacy of Catholicism in their lands). In
exchange for their service, Orthodox communities already inhabiting the Frontier territory, as
well as those who settled there during the eighteenth century, were granted the ability to freely
practice their religion; concessions went as far as to include the establishment of an Orthodox
patriarchate at Karlovci.47 It is for this reason that the territory of the Military Frontier had a very
large (Serb) Orthodox population, and this population was to continue to be part of Croatian
society until the secessionist wars during the first part of the 1990s.
As the nineteenth century progressed, however, the gradual breakdown of Ottoman power and
territory made the threat from the Monarchy’s southern neighbor appear increasingly remote.
Repeated calls were made for the frontier to be dismantled, and its territory reincorporated into
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Croatia proper (and, by extension, returned to the authority of the Kingdom of Hungary). The
negotiations for the Ausgleich of 1867 included provisions for the gradual dissolution of the
Military Frontier.48 The final remnants of the Croatian Military Frontier were dismantled in
1881, although by that time the 1878 occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina had already rendered
the institution entirely superfluous in terms of territorial defense against the Turks.
Against this background it is little surprise that Svetozar Boroević opted to pursue a military
career. His father, Adam Boroević, had been an officer in the k.u.k. (kaiserliche und königliche)
army, and his brother Nikola likewise entered the officer corps. The elder Boroević had seen
action in most of the major deployments of the Monarchy’s forces during his career, including
the revolts of 1848/49 (during which he served in the counterrevolutionary force led by Croatian
Ban Josip Jelacic), the Austro-Prussian War in 1866, and the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina
in 1878.49 However, Adam Boroević’s career was still tied to the Military Frontier; his final
posting before his retirement was to a Frontier infantry regiment. 50 Nor did he manage to
advance in rank as his son did; Adam Boroević’s death notice in 1900 gives his rank as
Oberleutnant (i.e., First Lieutenant).51 Boroević’s mother, Anna Kovarbasic, was the daughter of
an officer in a Grenzer regiment. In a biographical account written by Boroević, he notes, likely
with a sense of pride, that since the establishment of the Military Frontier in 1529, all ablebodied members of his family had been soldiers. 52
The nature of the “frontier,” the border between peoples and cultures, was fated to mold and
impact Svetozar Boroevic throughout his life. In addition to serving as the frontier between the
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Habsburg and Ottoman realms, the territory was eventually to serve as the site of contestation
between Serbian and Croatian national groups. William O’Reilly draws an interesting parallel
between the publication of Fredrick Jackson Turner’s “frontier thesis” in 1893 and the near
simultaneous dissolution of the Military Frontier: while Turner argued that the closing of the
American frontier led to an increase in American solidarity and national identity (criticisms of
this argument notwithstanding), nothing of the kind occurred with the dissolution of the Military
Frontier.53 The relationship between the center (Vienna or Budapest) and the national groups at
the periphery became more strained rather than less. In addition, O’Reilly argues that the
Military Frontier represented a site of “exoticism” for the rulers of the Monarchy, a site where
the individuals in the metropole could perceive the “other” contrasted to themselves. 54 This
perception of the Grenzer as being the “other,” someone who is apart from “civilized” society,
was fated to haunt Svetozar Boroevic throughout his life, and, as we will see, was to continue to
influence memorialization of Boroevic following his death.
In examining the national identification, or lack thereof, among the population in the Military
Frontier, it is helpful to look at the example of another “borderland” area. There have been
several recent studies examining the relationship between Germans and Poles, and those who at
varying times identified as either, or both, depending on political expediencies. Brendan Karch,
in his study of the communities of Upper Silesia during the late 19 th and early 20th centuries,
found that the populations often shifted between the use of German and Polish in language, and
were more likely to identify with their local community (e.g., Upper Silesian) than with a
national group as a whole, frustrating efforts by both German and Polish national organizations
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to claim them.55 Likewise, James Bjork’s study of the same region (Upper Silesia) found that
Catholic German and Polish populations often worshipped in the same churches, and generally
were more inclined to see themselves as having stronger bonds by religion than by nationalism. 56
This last point is especially intriguing as we consider how religion (i.e., the practice of the
Orthodox faith) played a role in distinguishing Svetozar Boroevic and many of his Grenzer
contemporaries from the mainstream of society in Zagreb, Budapest, and Vienna, where the
religion of the majority was Catholicism.
Little is known about Boroević’s early life, although it has been suggested that, despite his
family’s service to the Monarchy, his childhood was one of relative poverty and humble living. 57
Boroević began the first of several military schools at the age of ten, and continued until his
commission as lieutenant in May 1875. Boroević’s military training would have included not
only tactics and strategy but also knowledge and skills vital to the service of the polyglot empire.
As an officer, Boroević was expected to gain familiarity with the languages of the troops under
his command.58 Boroević himself ultimately gained knowledge of German, Magyar, French,
Russian, and Slovenian, as well as (Serbo-)Croatian.59
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The Reich
The political milieu in which young Boroević attended the military academy proved to be
volatile on a number of fronts, as questions of the relationship between the state structure of the
Habsburg Monarchy and its constituent national groups continued to be worked out. At the time
of his birth in 1856, the Monarchy operated under the centralist structure imposed by the court in
Vienna following the events of the revolts of 1848 and 1849. For the brief period between 1849
and 1860, for perhaps the only time in its history (notwithstanding the abortive efforts of Joseph
II during the 1780s), the Habsburg Monarchy operated as a truly centralized state. Soon,
however, events mandated the abandonment of this neo-absolutist structure. First, a new
constitution proclaimed in 1860 promised the devolution of powers to regional governments.
Only a few years were permitted to this experiment; following the unsuccessful war with Prussia
in 1866, Magyar leaders saw an opportunity to extract concessions from Vienna, resulting in the
1867 Ausgleich and establishment of the dualist structure that characterized the remainder of the
Monarchy’s existence.
The importance of the army (or rather, armies) under the dualist system cannot be overstated.
After 1867, the Austro-Hungarian armed forces were divided into three main branches. The first
was the Common Army for the whole of the Monarchy, the k.u.k Armee. The two remaining
branches were the national armies for Cisleithanian Austria (the k.k. (kaiserlich-königlich)
Landwehr) and the Kingdom of Hungary (the Honved). From early on in the Monarchy’s
existence, the rulers of the Habsburg lands had favored the army, recognizing it as one of the few
institutions that served as a unifying force for the whole of the polyglot empire. 60 Such a view
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had been tested in recent memory; in 1848, when much of the Monarchy appeared to be in
danger of fragmenting along national lines, the soldiers of the army, regardless of national
identification, remained loyal to their state and ruler. 61
The basic structure of the k.u.k. Common Army, particularly the officer corps, had its genesis
during the reign of Maria Theresa (1740-1780). Recognizing the need for capable officers in the
wake of the monarchy’s wars with Prussia, Maria Theresa’s reign saw a conscious effort to
recruit and train officers from all social classes. 62 This policy paid quick dividends; by the end of
Joseph II’s reign in 1790, two-thirds of the officer corps came from commoner background. 63
Istvan Deak credits Maria Theresa with the final establishment of an army that was uniquely
“Austrian” (i.e., limited to and serving the whole of the Habsburg inheritance) as opposed to
“German” (i.e., serving the territories of the Holy Roman Empire), and mandating the display of
the Schwarzgelb (black & yellow, the Habsburg imperial colors) by her armed forces. 64 A final
legacy of the Theresian age was the establishment of the Military Order of Maria Theresa in
1757. This institution was fated to play a crucial role in the later career of Svetozar Boroević and
the final months of his life.
After 1867, most of the Croatian lands fell under the jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Hungary,
with the exception of the province of Dalmatia, which remained part of the Austrian half of the
Monarchy.65 However, the burgeoning Croatian nationalist movement cultivated the historical
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memory of the medieval Croatian state, which had existed as a separate kingdom prior to the
union of its crown with that of Hungary in the twelfth century. Croatian nationalists likewise
demanded a similar Ausgleich giving Croatia control of its own government. A partial victory on
this count was scored in 1868 with the ratification of the Nagodba agreement between Croatia
and Hungary, which provided Croatia with some measure of self-government, including a
representative assembly (Sabor) with some jurisdiction over local matters. Unlike the greater
agreement between Vienna and Budapest, the Nagodba left most of the real authority for Croatia
in the hands of the Hungarian government, including the appointment of post of royal Ban
(governor) of Croatia. The Ban, as a figure appointed by Budapest, was tasked with furthering
Magyar interests in Croatia, and electoral laws were to favor the election of Sabor deputies
friendly to the Budapest government. Like the rest of the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary,
Croatians found themselves under constant pressure from attempts to Magyarize them,
encouraging to identify culturally and linguistically with their more powerful neighbor.
Following his commission, one of Boroević’s earliest postings was as battalion adjutant in the
occupation force in Bosnia-Herzegovina following the Monarchy’s acquisition of the province in
1878. It was this posting that provided the occasion for the only published work written by
Boroević. Published in 1890 under the patronage of the k.k. Bosnia Railroad, Durch Bosnien
(Through Bosnia) provides Boroević’s thorough account of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
its history and people. Although the book reads much like the travelogue it was commissioned
as, it betrays some interesting insights into Boroević’s views on the national issue.
First, and perhaps most intriguingly, Boroević stresses the initial unity of the Croatian and
Serbian peoples.66 He goes on to discuss how the Croatian polity attempted to claim Bosnia
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following the retreat of the Turks after 1683, but also notes that, after the Habsburg occupation in
1878, a small segment of the population was hostile to Austro-Hungarian rule, and conducted a
campaign of terror against the rest of the inhabitants. 67 Boroević argues that, now that the land
has been subdued (albeit by force), rule by the monarchy will be better for the people than the
prior regime. Boroević argues that the new government will bring the culture of the west to the
previously backward province, extolling such wonders as the rail system that had been built
during the occupation.68 Although undoubtedly pro-Habsburg in outlook, Boroević’s account
still shows a surprising degree of balance in its descriptions of the native cultures and the
differences between the Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim populations of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Nevertheless, in these pages the reader sees no hint that he supported the concept of separate
nation states for these disparate groups, or could envision their existence outside the framework
of the Dual Monarchy. The work in itself is fairly conventional in its approach to the national
question; it reflects a pro-Habsburg discourse that normal for the Dual Monarchy’s governmental
and military elite classes.

Serb or Croat?
In considering Boroević's views on the nationality question among the South Slavs, it is vital
to examine the response Boroević had with respect to his own sense of national identity. As
stated, observers contemporary and since have debated whether he should be considered
Croatian or Serbian. Rudolf Kiszling (1882-1976), who served under his command on the
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Isonzo, insisted that, although of Orthodox background, Boroević throughout his life considered
himself Croatian.69 As we will see in Chapter 5, he identified as such when he addressed the
Slovene National Council in November 1918:

Not as a general and not as the last son of my country, but as a patriot, who loves his
homeland at least as much as any other Croat, I point out the consequences which will
inevitably come. I’m appealing to the patriotism of the National Council to do everything in
its power to ensure that the armies do not degenerate into hordes, destroying these new
foundations.70

My research has not turned up any writings from Boroević himself, with the partial exception
of this statement, that address the issue. However, his strong identification with the territory of
the Frontier, along with his political aspirations (to be discussed shortly) appear to lend support
to Kiszling’s supposition. At the least, it sheds light on an interesting facet of national
identification in the Balkans - that at this time, the currently accepted ethnic demarcation
(Orthodox=Serb, Catholic=Croat) was not as static a category as it was to become. Under this
paradigm, it was perfectly acceptable for an Orthodox South Slav to identify as Croatian.
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Likewise, as Croatian historian Ivo Banac has discovered, there were instances of Catholic South
Slavs who identified as Serbian.71
The larger question of national identification that was to play such a large role in Boroević’s
final years, was, in fact, barely considered an issue at all for much of his life. Although
historiography in the Balkans has suffered from a considerable degree of “retroactive
nationalization,” more recent works have appeared to correct this imbalance. Among these are
John Fine’s 2006 study When Ethnicity Did Not Matter in the Balkans. Fine, along with Benedict
Anderson, argues that ethnicity is an invented category, one that only holds because individuals
have consciously accepted the label. 72 Likewise, Fine argues that references in sources dating
from prior to the 19th century that refer to “Serbs” or “Croats” more properly describe residents
of the political units of Serbia or Croatia, rather than the ethnic category, and the failure to
recognize this distinction has led many scholars to assume national sentiment (in the modern
sense) where none had in fact existed. 73
As Michael Portmann points out, national identity is just one manifestation of an innate
inclination of individuals to associate with a larger collective identity, one that can be identified
from antiquity. Collective identity can be based on a number of factors, including local, regional,
ethnic, national, cultural, religious, and social class affiliations. 74 Viewed in this respect,
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someone like Svetozar Boroević could easily identify himself simultaneously as a Croat, an
adherent of Orthodoxy, a soldier, and a subject of the Habsburg monarch. Likewise, the reality
was that many citizens of the monarchy simultaneously embraced multiple identities that were
later to be seen in some quarters as being contradictory.75
This vagueness with respect to the question of national identification was aided by the
reluctance of officials in both parts of the Monarchy to assign national status to individuals. Like
the Qualificatsionsliste, population censuses for both Cisleithanian Austria and the Kingdom of
Hungary did not usually record a person’s ethnicity or nationality, instead making note of the
primary language used by the respondent. The Austrian legal system, in an 1881 ruling, declared
that use of the language and customs of any specific group was not sufficient for the law to
consider an individual as belonging to that group; instead the person was to be “considered a
member of that national group to which he belongs according to his own declaration.” 76
The question of national identity was eventually to pervade the populations of the Balkans
outside of the intelligentsia class. Beginning with the Illyrian movement in the years after 1815,
scholars in the South Slav territories devoted increasing effort to exploring the implications of
national identification and pride, and began to gradually disseminate this focus to the rest of the
population. Through efforts by Ljudevit Gaj and his successors, the South Slav peoples (here,
Croatians, Serbians, and Slovenes) developed a consciousness of their unique languages and
literature that fostered the development of national identity.77 This was accompanied by a move
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among the leadership of the three groups to make common cause in establishing an autonomous
political entity along the lines achieved by Hungary in 1867 (in other words, the eventually
heralded “trialist” solution). However, even by 1914 the permeation of specific South Slav
national identities (Croatian or Serbian) was by no means universal among the inhabitants of the
region; as I will argue at the end of this study, the failure of many to “pick a side” on the national
question likely contributed to the limited success among those seeking to foster the adoption of a
“Yugoslav” identity in the years after 1918.
The issue was to take on greater importance with events along the Monarchy’s southern
frontier in the opening years of the twentieth century. An independent South Slav state, Serbia,
having gained its full independence in 1878 in another consequence of the Russo-Turkish War
and the Congress of Berlin, was beginning to expand its territory and influence among the other
nationalities of the Balkans. Although it had been largely contained under the Obrenovic
dynasty, a palace coup in 1903 brought to the throne a new government under the Karadjordjevic
dynasty, which was stridently anti-Habsburg and actively seeking a leadership role among the
South Slav peoples. Increasingly after 1903 Serbia used the nationality issue in part to challenge
the Monarchy’s claims to both the territory and people of its South Slav provinces, including the
Bosnian Crisis of 1908, where Serbia’s protest over the Monarchy’s formal annexation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina might have led to war but for Russia’s urging Serbia to back down. A
number of observers within the Habsburg High Command, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf chief
among them, feared that the day was not long coming that a reckoning with Serbia would be
required.
Meanwhile, the state system of the Habsburg Monarchy in many ways attempted to respond
to the burgeoning national movements with the fostering of civic nationalism (as described in the
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Introduction). Such moves were increasingly important in the second half of the nineteenth
century as the dynasty came to terms with the sudden alteration of its own sense of identity
brought about by the battlefield verdict of 1866, which resulted in the loss of Austria’s claim to
leadership of the German states to Prussia and ultimately its exclusion from Bismarck’s German
Reich. Therefore, a new ideology was needed to justify the Habsburg Monarchy’s rule and
mission in Central Europe. Celebrations of the two major unifying institutions, the Habsburg
dynasty and the armed forces, continued throughout the last years of the nineteenth century and
especially the opening years of the twentieth. 78 Among these are the jubilee (50-yearanniversary) celebrations of the reign of Franz Josef. Although many of the planned activities for
the major celebration in 1898 were canceled due to the assassination of Empress Elizabeth, the
preparations for the commemoration of the event included the publication of literature glorifying
the history of the Habsburg realm and its rulers. The armed forces of the Monarchy played a key
role in these festivities. Although there is no evidence that Svetozar Boroević was present in
Vienna for the major celebration, he would have been aware of literature disseminated to soldier
and citizen recognizing the event, and he would have been presented with the commemorative
jubilee medal that was given to each member of the officer corps. A similar celebration was held
in 1908 to commemorate the 60th anniversary of Franz Josef’s rule. 79
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Nor was this limited to major anniversaries; “visibility events” were a common feature of the
dynasty. Official visits to the different parts of their realm and personal interactions with their
subjects had long been a tool used by the Habsburg monarchs (as well as their spouses and
children) to foster loyalty among their people - Franz Ferdinand’s ill-fated motorcade through
Sarajevo in 1914 was just one such public relations mission. 80
Even with these attempts to emphasize the common bonds holding the peoples of the
monarchy together, the voices demanding national rights and autonomy continued to grow
louder as the nineteenth century drew to a close, and, by the early twentieth century, various
reform plans continued to circulate among those close to the imperial court, attempting to find a
way to placate these demands and keep the Habsburg inheritance intact. Many South Slavs
placed their hope in the trialist idea, creating a separate autonomous Yugoslav entity on par with
Cisleithanian Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary, especially when the Heir Presumptive
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, appeared to be engaging with Croatian leaders to build a base of
support for just such an action upon taking the throne.81 Subsequent scholarship, however, has
revealed that there is little, if any, evidence, that Franz Ferdinand had any intention of
implementing a trialist plan, though he often used the threat of doing so as leverage in dealing
with Magyar leaders.82 Greater prospects lay in various attempts to federalize the monarchy,
creating semiautonomous units based on nationality, such as the plan put forward by Aurel
Popovici in his 1906 work, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Gross-Österreich (The United States of
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Great Austria).83 However, no real effort was made to implement any of these reform plans until
the very end of the war, when the situation for the Monarchy was far beyond saving.
This was the Scylla and Charybdis that Svetozar Boroević found himself attempting to
navigate during the course of his career, demands for loyalty to his national group on the one
hand, and for loyalty to the state on the other. As it shall become clear, Boroević firmly believed
that there was no contradiction in embracing both identities. His negotiation of these obstacles,
however, proved to have a tragic outcome.
Following his posting in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Boroević’s career continued to advance.
Following a brief stint as an instructor at the Theresian Military Academy at Wiener Neustadt,
Boroević advanced through the ranks with postings in Budapest, Klagenfurt, Prague, and Zagreb.
His personal life continued to develop as well, with his marriage to Leontine von Rosner (who
was the daughter of a General Staff officer) in 1899 and the birth of his son Friedrich in 1901. 84
Along with military promotion, Boroević was awarded honors as well. In 1905 he gained a noble
title from the Hungarian crown, allowing him to append the predicate “von Bojna” to his name.
In November 1908 he earned the Knight’s Cross of the Order of Leopold.
The rapid rise of Boroević through the ranks can be attributed to three factors. The first was
Boroević’s own skill as an officer and his dedication to his vocation. The second was the fact
that he, as an officer of South Slav nationality, represented a group among whom it was
increasingly important that the Monarchy maintain a good image. Thus his success also bolstered
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the narrative that, not only would the peoples of the South Slav territories continue to receive
favorable treatment, but that the Habsburg Monarchy remained the best framework for their
prosperity. Finally, one cannot forget the role his marriage might have played. In marrying
someone of German nationality tied to the officer corps, Boroević may have further
demonstrated his loyalty to the Monarchy and its mission in the eyes of some in the High
Command. Though of proud Croatian heritage, he could also integrate well into a German-ruled
system. As we will see toward the end of this study, this appearance of assimilation was to have
interesting, and problematic, implications for Boroević and his legacy.
The years prior to the outbreak of war in 1914 saw Boroević stationed in command VII
Zagreb Landwehr District, which included the 42nd Honved (Hungarian army) unit. This latter
unit bore two points of pride; first, this unit was constituted entirely of soldiers from the territory
of Croatia, and second, it was the unit designated as the official Domobranstvo (Home Guard)
army for Croatia, based in Zagreb. As a result of stellar performance during maneuvers in 1908
the unit gained the attention of the heir apparent, Franz Ferdinand, who referred to it as “eine
Teufelsdivision” (a “devil’s division”), a designation it retained up to 1918. 85 Boroević received a
final prewar promotion in 1913, with a promotion to Infantry General and assignment to the 51 st
Infantry Regiment.
During these formative years one can already detect insights into the mentality that influenced
many of his command decisions during his later assignments on the Eastern Front and Isonzo
Front. A number of examples of his personal and official correspondence betray the extent to
which his Grenzer background and military training shaped his worldview. In a letter to a friend
(and fellow Grenzer) Stefan Sarkotic, Boroević states: “If I were able, I would put the whole of
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humankind into the bonds of discipline, and within this same framework force them to work.” 86
He goes on to emphasize the necessity of maintaining strict discipline among troops, lamenting
that the same is more difficult to implement in society at large. Fortunately, he believes that the
mentality of their people (i.e., Croats) has developed to the point where “I can [be] pleasant more
often than I need to be unpleasant” with them. 87 It is likely that this faith in order and discipline
was inculcated in Boroević from an early age, certainly in his military training but possibly from
upbringing as well; as his father was witness to many of the most tumultuous events of the
nineteenth century in the Habsburg realm, it is possible that he, a military man himself, likewise
adopted such an outlook to pass onto his sons.
In addition, there are a number of indicators which point to the higher aspirations that
Boroević held. A considerable preponderance of evidence points to a desire by Boroević to
eventually gain no less an office than that of Ban of Croatia. His correspondence provides
support to this conclusion.
In a 1908 letter to Alexander Brosch, adjutant to Franz Ferdinand, Boroević displays gratitude
at the esteem his position has earned him among his people:

Here I take responsibility for all of my soldiers upon myself, but I wouldn’t have it any
other way; from the Ban to the Archbishop all the way down to the lowest officials,
mayors and chaplains I have had goodwill heaped upon me. 88
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Likewise, in a 1910 letter to Brosch, seeking promotion to Commandant of the 13th Corps,
Boroević relishes in the opportunity the position would afford him to be of service not only to
the Crown but to the Croatian people:

With God’s help and my good fortune I offer my candidacy for the [command of the]
13th Corps. My existing knowledge of the language, the land and the people recommend me
over my predecessors who did not have these connections to the land, while I, who have
these connections, which will be invaluable in resolving the major issues His Majesty
requires in this assignment. These are hard to purchase, hard to obtain, yet hardest to spare if
one is to carry out the requirements of this vital position. This aspect is sadly
underestimated! … Nobility, Gentry, Bureaucrats, Catholic and Serbian [sic] clergy, they all
know me and I know them; the land is known to me through numerous travels in all its
parts.89

These statements, taken together, led Eduard Hoffmann, in his survey of Boroević’s career, to
conclude that Boroević certainly aspired to higher office within the Croatian lands, up to and
including the office of Ban.90
A final, and most controversial, account lends further support to this aspiration. An intriguing
note in Rudolf Kiszling’s Nachlass remarks on news reports that Boroević’s funeral service was
presided over by the Catholic bishop of Klagenfurt, a seemingly unusual choice given Boroević’s
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identification with the Orthodox Church. Included in this note is speculation that Boroević may
have converted to Catholicism at some point in order to better position himself to gain
appointment to the position of Ban.91 I have found, however, no evidence that this was the case;
more likely explanations for the bishop’s presence are the respect due to Boroević as a result of
his standing in the former Austro-Hungarian army, as well as the logistical issues associated with
involving Orthodox clergy in an almost entirely Catholic region in southern Austria. Let us not
also forget that Boroević’s wife, who if not a practicing Catholic was from a Catholic
background, would have been the one who organized the funeral.
Just how realistic this aspiration to the Banal office was is a matter of some debate. Recall
that the position of Ban was one appointed by the Hungarian government, and the occupants of
the office were expected to serve Budapest’s interest in the territory rather than Vienna’s, or,
indeed, Zagreb’s. Of the Bans to hold office after 1868, most were ethnic Magyars, and when a
conflict between Hungarian and Croatian interests occurred, could be expected to side with the
former. For example, during his 20-year reign as Ban, Count Karoly Khuen-Hedervary (18491918; served as Ban 1883-1903) imposed strong magyarization measures on the Croatian people.
However, Boroević’s stock in Budapest continued to rise during his career, and he became an
increasingly public representative of the Croatian people in the armed forces. A search of the
Agramer Zeitung (Zagreb’s German-language daily) turns up numerous mentions of Boroević
with increasing frequency during the decade prior to 1914 (a period which coincided with his
posting to the unit based in Zagreb). He had the asset of having served under the heir
presumptive, Franz Ferdinand (during his posting as General Staff Chief for the 8th Corps), and
in this capacity won exposure to the press and the imperial court when his unit participated in
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maneuver exercises in 1899.92 Moreover, Boroević cultivated a working relationship with
Magyar leader Istvan Tisza (1861-1918), who served on and off as Hungarian prime minister
during the years prior to and during the war. 93 Although the obstacles to Boroević achieving this
goal would still have been formidable, his reputation in both halves of the monarchy had grown
by the beginning of the war, and one can speculate that the acclaim and rank he received during
the war would have left him in at least as a strong contender for the role of Ban after the war, had
the Monarchy survived intact.
The beginning of 1914 saw Svetozar Boroević already far advanced in the hierarchy of the
officer corps of the k.u.k. armed forces, and signs pointed to continued success and promotion
for the enterprising Grenzer. He had no way of knowing that the cataclysm that was to begin in
July of that year was fated to raise his esteem among his government and his people to its highest
level, before destroying it utterly.
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CHAPTER 2
INTO THE MAELSTROM

The outbreak of war at the end of July 1914 was a watershed moment for the Habsburg
Monarchy, above all for its South Slav territories. Although many among the army High
Command feared the presence of a “fifth column” of “Serbians” supportive of their conationals
in the Serbian kingdom, historiography has shown that the vast majority were, at least in the
early stages of the war, loyal to the Habsburg state. In some respects, it is moot what exactly
constituted a “Serbian” in the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1914, as the discussion of Boroević’s
own understanding of his identity in the previous chapter shows: though Orthodox in terms of his
religion, he felt otherwise culturally or ethnically Croatian. Certainly, Serbs and Croats spoke a
common language (Serbo-Croatian), which differed only in terms of regional dialect. One can
distinguish the Serbian and Croatian languages through their script, the first using Cyrillic, the
second Latin script. But many people were not even literate yet in this part of Europe in 1914.
Although the loyalty of several of the Monarchy’s other national groups were to be called into
question, most notoriously in the case of the Czechs (as this chapter will discuss), the adherence
of South-Slav citizens and soldiers to the state was generally to be taken for granted. 94
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However, this did not stop the rumors about suspected disloyalty among South Slav citizens
and soldiers, which can be viewed as a reflection of a paranoid psychological projection on the
part of the German- and Magyar-speakers, who were much more conscious of their national
identity. It did not help that the prime enemy was the Serbian nation-state, and that Gavrilo
Princip and his comrades identified as nationalists acting (unofficially) on behalf of that state. 95
During the opening weeks of the war, news media relayed almost daily reports of suspected
treachery. In perhaps the most extreme case of rumormongering, a report came that Svetozar
Boroević himself had been shot for espionage. 96
Of course, in reality Boroević was alive and well and preparing to depart with his unit to the
Eastern Front. At the outbreak of war Boroević was in command of the VI Corps, attached to the
k.u.k. Fourth Army under the command of General Moritz von Auffenberg (1852-1928). The
Fourth Army was deployed to Galicia, on the Russian frontier, in August 1914, along with the
First and Third Armies. Mobilization began immediately upon the declaration of war, though this
process proceeded slowly due to logistical problems in attempting to mobilize on two fronts
(against Russia and Serbia) simultaneously. The Fourth Army (along with the First and Third)
were in position in Galicia in the middle of the month, with expected reinforcements from the
Second Army to arrive from the Balkan front following the anticipated rapid victory over Serbia.
Boroevic’s unit was marching into another borderland, that of the Kingdom of Galicia. This
territory had been part of the larger Polish state that, prior to its dissolution during the eighteenth
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century, had served as a buffer between the rival powers of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Now, of
course, Polish populations existed on sides of three imperial borders, at times intermingled with
German and other ethnic groups97

Arrival at the Front
Boroević’s fixation on troop discipline, as well as his frustration at a perceived lack of
discipline among his soldiers, continued to bedevil him as his unit arrived at the front. 98 Upon
their arrival in Galicia, Boroević sent the following message to the senior officers of VI Corps:

I am not impressed with what I have seen so far of the combat and service troops of this
corps. There is a lack of serious discipline and order; the men are letting themselves go,
and some of the officers too. There is a lack of focus, and concentration is not at the level
that will be required in the imminent encounter with the enemy… Therefore it is a duty,
and a requirement of wisdom too, without a moment’s delay, to bring officers and men to
an understanding that the primary and most authoritative condition for success is iron
discipline.99

In truth, however, the very structure of the polyglot army worked against him. According
to Carl von Bardolff (1865-1953) who served as commander of the 29 th Infantry Brigade (part of
Boroević’s VI Corps), his unit’s soldiers spoke no fewer than five different languages, and
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observed five different religions; as many of the troops did not understand each other’s
languages, they often found it easier to communicate in English. 100 In all likelihood, the
remainder of the units of the VI Corps were of similar composition, and faced similar
communication challenges and potential cultural misunderstandings. 101 Boroević’s attempts to
impose order on a chaotic situation, however, appear to have borne some fruit, and were soon to
bear rich dividends for the Habsburg war effort on the eastern front.
The first major engagement on the eastern front took place at Krasnik on August 23-25, 1914,
a skirmish fought primarily between the Austro-Hungarian First Army and the Russian Fourth
Army. It was the next engagement, the Battle of Komarow (August 26-28), however, where
Boroević was fated to achieve his first battlefield success. In this battle, Boroević’s VI Corps
was deployed as the vanguard of an attack which, according to Fourth Army commander
Auffenberg, was intended to encircle the Russian forces and produce an annihilation comparable
to that of the ancient Roman defeat at Cannae at the hands of Hannibal’s Carthaginian army. 102
However, the battle began inauspiciously for the Austro-Hungarian forces, with the Fourth Army
taking heavy casualties. So severe was the routing of the 15 th Infantry Division that its
commander, Major General Friedrich Wodniansky (Bardolff’s immediate commanding officer),
responded by taking his own life on the night of August 27. 103 By the dawn of August 28 it
appeared that Auffenberg’s plan may have been developing into a “reverse Cannae.”
On that day, Boroević reorganized his command, including several units that had taken heavy
casualties, such as Wodniansky’s 15th Infantry and the 39th Honved, and was able to halt the
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Russian advance at Komarow. By placing the remnants of the 15th under the temporary
command of the rearguard commander Fieldmarshall Lieutenant Edler von Schenk, he was able
to make an otherwise obliterated unit again combat-ready. 104
The results of the Battle of Komarow bore immediate dividends for the Austro-Hungarian war
effort, and for the Fourth Army especially. Auffenberg was awarded an additional battlefield
honor, appending the predicate “von Komarow” to his name, as well as a cash award. 105 It was
Boroević, however, who subsequent observers have given the lion’s share of the credit for the
victory, hailed as the “victor of Komarow.” 106 Boroević, for his part, was more than happy to
accept this credit; in a contemporary letter to a friend he stated how

the Battle for Komarow would have been lost without me. Had the Fourth Army
been unable to shift its forces, thanks to my corps, the renewed offensive would have
been impossible, and the war would have been lost. 107

Very soon afterward, his role in turning the tide of battle at Komarow resulted in further
promotion and accolades for him.
At the same time as the Fourth Army was fighting at Komarow, the k.u.k. Third Army, under
the command of Rudolf Brudermann (1851-1941), was attempting to fend off a threat by Russian
forces at Lemberg (Lwow/L’viv/Lvov), the capital of Galicia. Facing a force that considerably
outnumbered it, the Third Army’s attacks during the last week of August fell into a pattern -
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“shot to a standstill by Russian defensive fire and then enveloped from the flanks by Russian
counterattacks.”108 Battered by Russian onslaught, the Third Army retreated from Lemberg,
surrendering it to the Russians on September 2.
The loss of Lemberg to the Russians proved nearly catastrophic for the Austro-Hungarian war
effort, and the High Command took immediate action to prevent troop morale from plummeting.
Brudermann was assigned the blame for the loss and was relieved of his command on September
4. Although a memo from the High Command to Franz Joseph’s Military Chancellery might
have implied that Brudermann’s removal from service was temporary--“For the duration of
General Brudermann’s illness, General Boroević will be entrusted with the command of the
Third Army--, this was merely a polite cover for putting the unsuccessful commander out to
pasture.109 Thus ended the career of an officer who had once been considered a favorite of the
court.110 In his place, Svetozar Boroević was appointed to the command of the Third Army. In
his memoirs, Conrad states that he chose Boroevic for the post because “his great capability was
already known to me in peacetime, and he had already proven to be a prudent, strong-willed, and
energetic leader through the difficult Battle of Komarow.” 111 High praise indeed, and ironic as
well, considering how the two officers were to be in conflict through most of the time they
worked together.
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In Command of the Third
Once he took command of the Third Army, Boroević gave the following address to the
troops:

As the victor of a seven-day murderous battle I have been named commander of the
Third Army; I would like to extend to all nationals of the same [here, of the Third Army]
my greetings as a soldier and comrade. The services of the brave troops of this army, the
stresses and strains, the deprivations, that they have tolerated, the losses they have
suffered up to now, are known to me. But those troops which I now lead that have
suffered great losses, will suffer still more, but most of all will our opponents! My old
soldier’s luck has put me in this position. I wish to bring this luck with me to the Third
Army; that will certainly help strengthen it. The Third Army, I am certain, will in no case
bring shame upon their homeland and in the coming days will achieve our highest goal the satisfaction of our highest commanders!112

It is tempting to read a nationalist (or worse yet, supranational) appeal into Boroević’s
remarks, with references to “nationals” (Angehörigen) and homeland (Heimat). However, the
Third Army at this point was not composed of soldiers of any particular nationality, any more so
than the other Habsburg military; it was composed of diverse Landwehr and Honved units from
different parts of the Monarchy, including Tyrolean units and Slavic commanders. 113 Therefore it
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would be premature to take this statement as anything but a general appeal to bolster troop
morale in the face of the recent reversals.
Upon taking command of the Third Army, Boroević was immediately confronted with a
dilemma. Lemberg remained in Russian hands, and the fortress at Przemsyl was under siege.
Moreover, as Hungarian Prime Minister Istvan Tisza declared at a war conference in December,
the threat to Galicia put the heartland of Hungary under threat not only from Russia but also
from Romania, which might now seek to join the war to gain Transylvania. 114
Tisza had good reason to be worried: With Lemberg under Russian control and Przemsyl
threatened, Habsburg control of Galicia hung on by a thread. If Galicia fell, there would be little
to stop a Russian invasion of Hungary by descending from the Carpathian mountain range on to
the Hungarian Plain. It is at this moment that Boroević earned the title “Defender of the
Carpathians,” that was later to be etched on his memorial marker (Fig. 3). In addition, he was to
be referred to as the “Savior of Hungary” and the “Hindenburg of the Carpathians” 115
His crucial role as military chief was perhaps most evident at the Battle of Limanowa
(December 1-12, 1914). Here Boroević’s Third Army, in coordination with the Fourth Army
(which by this time was under the command of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand) was tasked with
defending the Cracow region against incursion by the Russian Third Army under Aleksei
Brusilov and Radko Dmitriev. Like Komarow, this was to be a hard-fought battle, the results of
which were far from a foregone conclusion.
Indeed, at one point on December 9 the impression was that Boroević’s “hesitant” conduct
had ruined the impact of the Fourth Army’s offensive and ceded the advantage to Dmitriev’s
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army.116 Had Boroević not been able to turn things around, it is very likely that he would have
found himself cashiered at the battle’s end, as his predecessor and former CO had been. 117
However, the tide of battle did turn, and Boroević deployed the west wing of the Third Army
into an attack on Neu Sandez (Nowy Sacz) that ultimately clinched the victory on December 12.
The results of the Battle of Limanowa were likewise momentous. General Ruzski,
commander of the Russian Northwest Front, admitted in a contemporary interview that the
Austro-Hungarian response was a “strategic masterpiece” that halted the Russian war effort in
Galicia at least temporarily.118 Subsequent observers have agreed, assigning Limanowa as the
event primarily responsible for preventing a Russian invasion of Hungary. 119
Conrad had grand plans of using Boroević’s army to follow up the victory at Limanowa by
having the Third Army continue to pursue the Russians and inflict an even more damaging blow
on them; Boroević was apparently unaware of Conrad’s intention but planned the same
offensive, one of the relatively rare occasions the two commanders were on the same page. 120
The planned attack, however, was not to be; reconnaissance revealed that the Russians had
already fortified their positions, and weather conditions were not favorable for an assault.
Instead, much of the remainder of his tenure on the Carpathian front was tied into the defense of,
and then attempts to reclaim, the fort of Przemysl. Although his later actions were to be the
subject of intense scrutiny by both contemporary and subsequent observers, his success (or lack
thereof) as a commander on the Carpathian front has largely been excused; a recent study of the
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war on the Eastern front opined that Boroevic was “too constrained by terrain, weather, and
lashing messages from Conrad to display his ability.” 121
For the next nine months Boroević’s valiant (though ultimately unsuccessful) attempts to
protect the fort served to enhance his esteem, through three major offensives designed to remove
the Russian threat to Przemysl in December 1914, and January and February 1915. 122 Although
his army suffered setbacks and reverses, Boroević, unlike his predecessor, somehow escaped
blame for these losses. On the contrary, he was awarded further battlefield honors: the Order of
the Iron Crown (Sept 1914), the Grand Cross of the Order of Leopold (October 1914), and the
First Class of Military Merit (May 1915). These differing responses to the performance of the
two Third Army Commanders could possibly point to a greater understanding that reversals
suffered by Boroević were beyond his control, or that his actions served to prevent further
damage. There is, however, something to be said that an idealization of what Boroević
represented may have been of influence: the kaisertreu South Slav officer, who by his steadfast
support for the Habsburg monarchy showed the errant ways of the Serbian (and other nationalist)
rogues. This would not have been the first time that Boroević’s experience was to support a
national or imperial narrative, and it was far from the last. In the eyes of the High Command, it
may have been crucial to maintain Boroević’s image front and center, especially to forestall
South Slav citizens gravitating toward Serbia in light of the then poor performance of the
Monarchy’s troops on the Balkan front.
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Nor did the importance of Boroević’s position go unnoticed by the Court or the High
Command. Notwithstanding his disputes with Conrad (which I will discuss presently) Boroević
was greatly valued as an officer, as a January 1915 letter from Archduke Friedrich (titular
commander of the Austro-Hungarian army) unintentionally reveals:

Your Excellency,
From different quarters I have heard reports that you have not been getting the necessary
goodwill from your subordinate commanders as a result of your treatment of them. Even His
k.u.k. Apostolic Majesty was displeased to hear of the measures taken with regard to the
10th Corps.
In recognition of your excellent leadership capabilities, as well as an appreciation of your in these difficult times certainly valuable - energy, I feel obliged to bring these matters to
your Excellency’s attention.
Multiple higher command offices in the Third Army are newly occupied, or have
commanders whose units have recently been assigned to the Third. It would be highly
regrettable if these commanders, who certainly strive with full devotion be most effective in
their new posts in the upcoming decisive days, are adversely affected in their service ability
by the feeling that they are receiving no good will from your Excellency.
The now five-and-a-half month long campaign has warped our judgment; the enormous
physical, mental, and spiritual needs of the gigantic struggle but shaken our ability to resist,
made us sensitive. I appeal to your Excellency’s soldier’s heart, to take into account this
fact, because I am convinced that the troops and their commanders will be inspired by a
responsive goodwill of their superiors to highest performance in these troubled times.
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With the highest approval of his k.u.k. Apostolic Majesty, I choose the form of a letter to
your Excellency to relay my opinion in this matter, and I am convinced that you will prevent
personal upsets in command areas in the future. In the hope that your Excellency has
recovered from the recent Influenza outbreak, I wish for your coming actions strength,
endurance and complete success. 123

Even if this was a mild reprimand in urging Boroević to treat his subordinates with a bit more
circumspection and tact, once again we see that his value to the High Command was such that
they were willing to overlook Boroević’s shortcomings as a commander. What lessons Boroević
may have learned from Archduke Friedrich’s admonishment I will examine in the next chapter.
After Limanowa, the remainder of the month of December saw Boroević’s Third Army fail to
make any significant headway; rather, it found itself on the defensive against Russian attacks.
Nor did the holiday season bring any respite; the storied “Christmas truce” of the Western front
was not replicated at this time in this part of the Eastern front; the Third Army continued to fight
through the new year. In the Official History of the war, the Russians are blamed for refusing to
abide by the Pope’s call to suspend hostilities for the Christmas season (even though, as
Orthodox Christians, Russians were not particularly bound to listen to pronouncements from
Rome).124
Much of the scholarly literature on the Great War’s Eastern Front has already discussed the
brutal weather conditions and their effect on the soldiers, so merely a brief recapitulation here
will be necessary.125 The Austro-Hungarian armies, already poorly provisioned, did not have any
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suitable winter clothing or gear, owing to the High Command’s refusal to allow for the
possibility that the war could last into the winter months. 126 As a result thousands of soldiers fell
victim not to enemy fire but to exposure to the elements. In the words of one eyewitness, Colonel
Georg Veith:

The reports from these days are shocking. Everyday hundreds froze to death. The
wounded who were unable to drag themselves forward were left behind to die. Entire
ranks were reduced to tears in the face of the terrible agony. … For a full thirty days, not
one single man had any shelter. Hardly a battalion on the Habsburg front consisted of 200
men as lines grew thinner and thinner. Battle-weary front-line troops were continuously
being wrenched from one position to another to plug a newly formed gap. Medics and
those not seriously ill or injured were called into service. A constant state of mass
confusion reigned; a tremendous detriment to any military command. Apathy and
indifference were gaining a foothold and could not be contained. 127

Boroević led another relief effort in February 1915; however, again any advantage from this
maneuver was to be short lived. By the end of February, the grim realization dawned that the
Monarchy did not have the manpower to continue to defend the fort. 128 In early March the
Russian assault began in earnest, and on March 22, 1915, Przemsyl surrendered to Russian
troops.
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The fall of Przemsyl did not relieve any pressure on the Third Army. Skirmishing with
Russian forces continued for the remainder of March; the Third Army came under attack by
Russian forces the day after the fort surrendered. 129 The beginning of April set the stage for what
has become known as the “Easter Battle,” in which several units of Boroević’s army came under
targeted Russian assault. Intense fighting continued during the Easter week, with the most
decisive days of fighting being on Good Friday and Holy Saturday (April 2 and 3, 1915).
Although the tide of battle remained uncertain at first (with the Second Army being compelled
briefly to retreat), Russian forces were ultimately forced to withdraw. The Official History,
perhaps indulging in a flair for the dramatic, states that the Easter Battle had results of “world
historical importance,” one of which was that the Russians had been “forever denied a gateway
into Hungary.”130
The Easter Battle also served as the setting for the notorious incident involving Infantry
Regiment 28. This unit, composed of 95 percent Czech soldiers, faced off against a numerically
superior Russian force on April 3, 1915, and was decimated, with 300 soldiers forced into retreat
and 1,000 officers and men taken into Russian captivity.131 With such a high loss ratio, the
accusation soon arose that this regiment had failed to show appropriate battlefield valor, or even
that they had willingly defected to the enemy. As a result of these suspicions, Boroević ordered
the temporary disbanding of this unit on April 11, 1915. 132 Although later evidence emerged to
exonerate the soldiers of the 28th, including more information about the degree to which the
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regiment had been outmatched by their Russian adversary and how valiantly they had fought
before being overwhelmed, this incident continued to be cited as evidence to support the
“unreliability” of Czech soldiers, especially on the Eastern front. As we will see, however, the
28th was later re-established on the Italian front, where it served with distinction.
Of particular note is Boroević’s at times adversarial relationship with the Chief of Staff,
Conrad. During the winter of 1914-1915 the two often crossed swords over tactics. At the
beginning of February 1915, Boroević was forced to send reinforcements into battle piecemeal to
protect his army, in defiance of a direct order from Conrad to hold his line. 133 A week later, with
his army suffering considerable losses, Boroević unsuccessfully appealed to Conrad to suspend
the offensive until weather conditions improved. 134 As we will see, this pattern will recur later on
the Italian front. One is tempted to wonder whether something more than a mere difference of
opinion over tactics guided their animosity. Despite Conrad’s ostensible praise of him as an
officer, did Conrad bear Boroevic any particular ill will as a result of his not being of AustrianGerman ethnicity? Conrad’s biographer, Lawrence Sondhaus, reveals that Conrad had from early
in his career formed a firm Social Darwinist worldview, and saw a society in which Austrian
Germans were the cultural superiors as the norm/ideal. 135 Conrad was far from alone in this
assertion, for Boroevic was fated to encounter others who viewed him through this lens of
German superiority, not only throughout his career but even following his death.
Within the harsh conditions of the front, Boroević was repeatedly called upon to keep up the
morale of those under his command, often to demonstrate that even those who made sacrifices
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would be acknowledged. As we have already discussed, this could be a tall order for one who
had a reputation as a difficult taskmaster; however, some efforts made on Boroević’s part
document his intent to bolster his army’s morale. In a January 22, 1915, field order, Boroević
assured his troops that he was well aware of the difficulties that they labored under, and he had
complete faith (vollstes Vertrauen) in their abilities, closing with the assurance that their army
will soon march “shoulder to shoulder” with their German comrades to victory. 136 Another field
order of April 5, 1915, acknowledged the “hero’s death” of one Silvo Spiess von Braccioforte,
Commander of the 39th Infantry Regiment, awarding him the Order of the Iron Crown and the
Knight’s Cross of the Order of Leopold. 137 As the winter wore on, maintaining troop morale
became ever more crucial, as troops confronted with the harsh conditions at the front often
surrendered to apathy; the Official History alleges that the group most heavily afflicted were
soldiers of Slavic nationality, who became increasingly more reluctant to fight their fellow
Slavs.138 This is, of course, a not wholly unbiased source, and more recent historiography has
cast doubt on this assertion.139
Despite the hard-fought efforts of Boroević’s Third Army, the fortress of Przemsyl was not to
be finally recovered and secured until May 1915 with the opening of the Gorlice-Tarnow
offensive. By that time, however, Boroević himself was in the process of taking leave of the
Eastern Front, having been transferred to a new command, in response to the declaration of war
by Italy. It is this new command which was to cement Boroević’s reputation as a tenacious and
faithful military commander both with his contemporaries and in the eyes of history.
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CHAPTER 3
LION OF THE ISONZO

The Italian declaration of war on the Dual Monarchy of May 23, 1915, was far from
unexpected; the event had been anticipated and feared from the outset of the war, from the
moment during the July Crisis that the Italian government advised the Ballhausplatz (the
Austrian government) that they would not support their nominal allies and instead remain
neutral at the outbreak of hostilities.
This Italian neutrality, however, proved to be only a façade; it soon became clear that Italy
would cast its lot with the side that could offer it the most. Italy’s aspirations were directed to the
acquisition of Italia Irredente, those territories with large Italian populations or historic ties to
Italy that still lay outside the Italian kingdom after 1870, specifically Trentino, Trieste, and
Dalmatia - territories controlled by Austria-Hungary. Of course, these were not the only
territories the Italians were interested in; some in the Italian government might have liked to
recover Corsica, Nice and Savoy, the latter two territories relinquished to France by PiedmontSardinia in exchange for French assistance during the wars of Italian Unification. Likewise, they
coveted portions of Albania. But the Austrian territories were by far the most appealing, for
historic and nationalist reasons.
Aware of this point of contention, the German high command continually pressured their
counterparts in the Monarchy to surrender at least some of this territory to Italy in hopes of
gaining Italian support or at least continued neutrality. Franz Josef, however, refused to consider
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giving up any part of his patrimony, and repeatedly rebuffed this request. As late as March 1915,
at a Common Ministerial Council Meeting for the Monarchy, the idea of offering at least
Trentino to Italy was discussed – and promptly rejected. 140
The Entente powers, however, were not bound by such considerations, and were more than
happy to agree to offer their adversary’s lands to Italy to entice them into the war on their side.
Under the terms of the secret Treaty of London in January 1915, Italy was set to enter the war
against Austria-Hungary (though, significantly, not Germany at first) in exchange for all of the
territory it desired in Trentino (South Tyrol), Trieste, and along the Dalmatian coastline.
In doing so, the Italian government entered a maelstrom of nationalist contestation, as much
of this territory was inhabited not only (or even mostly) by Italian nationals, but by Germans
(South Tyrol) and South Slavs (Trieste and Dalmatia). Indeed, the Istrian peninsula, including
Trieste, as well as Dalmatia, was territory also claimed by Serbia, which, after emerging by 1913
from the recent Balkan Wars with enlarged territory and prestige, was positioning herself in a
leadership role for the South Slav peoples. This collision course between the two nominal allies
was ultimately to lead to problems at the peace settlement at the war’s end as well as continued
tension between Italy and Yugoslavia during the interwar period.
The Italian move inadvertently provided a propaganda tool for the Habsburg Monarchy, as it
allowed them to present the war with Italy to the South Slav population as a war to expel an
invader seeking to take over their lands. The location of the main theater of war, the Isonzo River
valley in the Slovene lands (Slovene Soča), aided this effort.141 Although this location was
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chosen for tactical reasons, allowing for easier troop access than across the more mountainous
terrain of the Tyrol (which throughout the war remained a secondary front with Italy,
notwithstanding Conrad’s support for offensives from the Alps), the location of the Isonzo at the
border of an area of national contestation was a major factor in the development of the war on
the Italian front. Once again, the borderland was to prove pivotal in shaping Boroevic’s
experience. This time, it was to be the ethnic frontier between the South Slavs (in this case,
Slovenes and Croatians) and Italians.
The final chapter of Boroević's military career was fated to unfold at this front. Much of the
source material for Boroević as both a commander and as a person during his posting to the
Isonzo front come from three major sources close to him. Anton Pitreich (1870-1939),
Boroević’s Chief of Staff, provides perhaps the most balanced picture, at times rendering both
approbation and criticism of Boroević’s actions. Karl Schneller (1878-1942), who served as
liaison between the General Staff and the Command for the Southwest (Italian) Front, displays
an intense dislike for Boroević, and his war diaries are at some points tinged with not too thinly
veiled contempt for the front commander. 142 A third source is Aurel Le Beau (1866-1922),
General Staff Chief for the Fifth Army – and Conrad’s brother-in-law – who also showed a
tendency to frequently come into conflict with Boroević over tactics and command style.
Most American observers of the war on the Italian front have at best a limited awareness of its
unfolding, usually based on Ernest Hemingway’s novel A Farewell to Arms, his tale of an
American expatriate serving alongside the Italian army (based in part on Hemingway’s own
wartime experience).143 The novel at times paints a picture of ineptitude among the Italian
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forces; while Hemingway exaggerated this at times, this bumbling reputation was not entirely
undeserved. The Italian Chief of the General Staff, Count Luigi Cadorna (1850-1928), had
virtually no actual combat experience, and owed his position largely to family connections; his
father had been instrumental in the operation that had secured Rome for the Italian government
in 1870. And, in general, the experience of the Italian army in the field in the years prior to the
war had been one of either limited success (as in the Libyan annexation in 1911), or disaster (as
in the 1896 attempt to invade Ethiopia).
In contrast, it appeared that Austria-Hungary had several tactical advantages; it retained
control of the terrain for most of the Isonzo campaign, a kind of “home field advantage,” and
had, at least initially, numerical superiority over the Italian forces. Moreover, the High
Command had more than ample warning to prepare for a coming Italian attack; while the first
battles of the Italian campaign were not to take place until the summer of 1915, by the end of
April troops were already being sent to the Italian front, weeks before the official declaration of
war.144 Although the Monarchy could have done without another front on which to fight, there
was reason to be optimistic, especially as news arrived from the East of the success of the
Gorlice-Tarnow Offensive that had started on May 1, 1915 – ironically, Boroević’s former
troops enjoyed their greatest success just after he left to take up his command in Italy. 145

Defending the Isonzo
Boroević arrived at the headquarters of the Fifth Army in Laibach (Ljubljana) on May 27,
1915 to assume his new command, and much like his previous postings, immediately began to
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micromanage the Fifth Army, issuing his first orders to the defenders of the line advising them to
choose the best possible position, and ordering that withdrawal from any portion of the front
could take place only with his direct authorization. 146 True to form, Boroević also almost
immediately experienced friction with his new command staff. In his diary entry of June 5,
Pitreich expresses frustration with Boroević for not having visited the front – to be sure, an
interesting criticism given Boroević’s penchant for micromanaging his army, one that might
speak to a determination to do things his own way, regardless of what opinions his fellow
officers may have voiced.147 One recent history of the Isonzo campaign alleges that this behavior
was to be the norm for Boroevic’s tenure on the Italian front; that, like Cadorna, he practiced
“chateau management” – rarely visiting the front and remaining mostly at headquarters. 148
Following Boroević’s assumption of the command, Le Beau expressed concerns regarding a
possible naval attack on Trieste, and the fact that they had no naval officer on staff; I have not
found a record of Boroević’s response to this concern. 149 Le Beau may have been worried about
something that had already been addressed; the Austro-Hungarian navy under Admiral Haus had
made a strong showing in the opening weeks of the war against Italy, and winning an
engagement over Italy that was decisive enough to ensured that the Adriatic remained under the
Monarchy’s control until late in the war. 150 This seems to suggest that Boroević did not believe
that Le Beau’s concern warranted action.
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The beginning of summer 1915 marked the start of the first cycle of what became known as
the Battles of the Isonzo. The First Battle of the Isonzo opened on June 23, 1915 and, like many
that were to follow, was largely indecisive. Other authors have provided comprehensive accounts
of the individual Isonzo battles, so there is no need to go into such exacting detail here; I will
only examine the general trends and the major turning points in the campaign as they related to
Boroević and the postwar fate of the territory. 151
The First Battle of the Isonzo set the tone for many of the subsequent engagements on that
front. First, it featured fierce, pitched battles over a fairly small expanse of territory. The difficult
terrain prevented either side from gaining a clear victory, though it did generally serve to favor
the defenders. Second, it ended without a clear gain for either side. Finally, the battle was cast,
especially on the Austro-Hungarian side, as a contest over national terrain. As Pitreich wrote in
his account of the First Battle: “The brave Croats would not let up and carefully cleaned up the
attackers, and bought their success with a loss of 110 dead and 190 wounded, numbers which
speak well to the defenders’ tenacity.” 152
The strategy employed by Boroević, particularly in the early stages of the Isonzo campaign,
was primarily a defensive one. Taking advantage of the knowledge that the Fifth Army’s
Slovene and Croatian soldiers were fighting with even greater motivation than their non-South
Slav colleagues to defend the territory against Italian encroachment, Boroević’s order was to
maintain the trench lines at all costs – units were to be kept in forward positions, and forestalling
avenues for retreat. This tactic proved effective at holding the Austro-Hungarian line during the
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First Isonzo Battle, but came at a significant human cost. 153 Official records reported the
Monarchy’s casualties from the First Battle at 10,000; modern observers believe the true figure
was much higher.154
This defensive strategy sheds additional light on Boroević’s personality and command style,
indicating a marked tendency toward stubbornness and tenacity. When a tactic had worked in the
past, Boroević’s first inclination was to repeat it, and was often slow to adapt when it became
clear that what had worked before was not successful in the present engagement. In addition, the
course of action he decided on was to be the last word, and when a difference of opinion arose
between Boroević and senior staff, major conflict was to ensue. We have already seen examples
of this mindset during Boroević’s time on the Eastern front; this is evident from his command on
the Isonzo as well, as I will discuss shortly. Finally, we can see from the extremely high casualty
counts that Boroevic as a commander could be considered a “man eater” in the style of other
commanders like British Field Marshal Douglas Haig (1861-1928). That Boroevic was able to
continue to command loyalty from his largely Slavic troops serves as a testament to both the
personal charisma he may have had as well as well as the force of national identification – recall
that many were fighting to defend this territory from Italians seeking to occupy it.
Several more battles were fought on the Isonzo front during the summer and autumn of 1915,
before the onset of winter brought a halt to campaign operations for the year. The Second, Third,
and Fourth Isonzo battles had similar outcomes to the first battle. One noteworthy aspect to the
Second Isonzo battle was the re-introduction into combat of the 28 th Infantry Regiment, the
Czech unit that had been disbanded following suspicions of disloyalty over the disastrous
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engagement in the Carpathians. The troops of the 28 th were transferred to the Isonzo to meet the
urgent need for reinforcements during the battle, and fought valiantly, earning praise from the
High Command for “steadfastness” and “withstanding the severest test of discipline”; repeated
shows of valor on the part of these troops led Franz Josef to order the full reinstatement of the
28th Infantry Regiment.155 The 28th had now atoned for the debacle of the Easter Battle of 1915,
and continued to serve with distinction on the Italian front. Although this unit had proven its
loyalty, the narrative of the unreliability of Slavic units, particularly Czech soldiers, remained
ingrained among the High Command. In furthering this myth, the High Command might have
unwittingly provided fodder to later nationalist observers, who were to argue that the Dual
Monarchy was already doomed from the outbreak of war in 1914 as it was no longer able to
count on the loyalty of its national groups.
The Third Battle of the Isonzo (October-November 1915), the Fourth Battle (late NovemberDecember 1915), and the Fifth Battle, fought in March 1916, likewise failed to result in any
appreciable shift in momentum for either side. The Sixth Battle of the Isonzo, however, was to
prove to be a game changer.
The town of Gorizia (German Görz, Slovene Gorica) lies directly on the linguistic border
between Italian and Slovene territory; it is for this reason that today Gorizia is divided between
Italy and Slovenia. To shore up Italian claims to the town, it became a prime target for the Italian
army during the war, and during the Sixth Battle, Cadorna gave the highest priority to capturing
Gorizia.
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Meanwhile, a second, controversial facet entered into the fighting on the ItalianHabsburg front because of Boroević’s decision to employ gas warfare against the Italian army,
just prior to the Sixth Battle. This decision did not, however, go unchallenged. In the
preparations for the battle, in his diary entry of July 1, 1916, Pitreich expresses serious
reservations about the use of gas, fearing that the casualties would not be as much as expected, of
the danger of gas affecting his own troops, and of the potential of such a move inciting retaliation
from the Entente.156 Indeed, the terrain and the climate of the Isonzo front made the deployment
of gas logistically far more difficult than on the Western front (where its use was also not always
very effective), a major reason why it had not been used by either side on the Italian front up to
this time.157 In the short term, the use of gas was a success – Italian casualties from the initial gas
attack numbered 6,900 –, but over the long term it did greater harm than good to the AustroHungarian war effort, as the enraged Italian forces became far less willing to accept surrender of
Austro-Hungarian troops without mistreating or killing them (after this time they could only
safely surrender in large numbers). 158 In hindsight, it seems that Pitreich’s fears were at least in
part justified.
Soon after the opening of the major Italian offensive that began the Sixth Battle, the tide of
battle began to turn against the Austro-Hungarian side rapidly. On August 6, 1916, the Italian
Third Army took control of Mount San Michele, a major tactical position which made continued
defense of Gorizia an almost impossible task for the k.u.k forces. Boroević spent all of August 7
and the morning of August 8 throwing everything possible into the effort to retake control of San
Michele, desperate to forestall the inevitable Italian capture of Gorizia if the elevated positions
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were not regained. Only when it became clear that this effort had failed, was the order to retreat
to the east bank of the Isonzo (in effect, abandoning Gorizia to the Italians) finally given. By
August 9, Austro-Hungarian troops had evacuated the city, and the Italian tricolor flew from its
battlements.
The loss of Gorizia was a considerable moral blow to the Monarchy’s war effort, on a par
with the loss of Lemberg in September 1914. It did not help that this defeat came as the
Monarchy was simultaneously contending with the losses incurred on the Eastern front as a
result of the Brusilov Offensive during the summer of 1916. In addition, the city of Trieste,
another major Italian target, was now exposed, and needed to be protected from attack. The
Monarchy’s campaign on the Isonzo had been a defensive war since the beginning; after this
defeat and the loss of the key town, it became even more so. As Pitreich states in his account, the
name “Görz” was to become a “political slogan” among the Austro-Hungarian army, as the
recovery of the city was to become one of the goals of the war effort on the Isonzo front over the
next year.159 Ernest Hemingway was later to have his protagonist remark about Gorizia, “…the
town had been captured very handsomely but the mountains beyond it could not be taken and I
was very glad the Austrians seemed to want to come back to the town some time, if the war
should end, because they did not bombard it to destroy it but only a little in a military way.” 160
The first part of this statement was not far from the truth; though, of course, the damage done to
the town by the conflict was far greater than Hemingway’s words indicate.
Although the recovery of Gorizia was now a major aim of the Monarchy’s efforts on the
Isonzo front, conditions were fated not to allow this for another year, despite a number of
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counteroffensives. During the remainder of 1916, several major engagements took place,
including the Seventh Battle of the Isonzo (September 14-18, 1916), the Eighth (October 10-12),
and the Ninth (November 1-4). In these battles the Austro-Hungarian war effort failed to make
headway, however, though they succeeded in defending the front against an additional Italian
advance. The cost of defending the territory proved staggering, as the Monarchy was now
incurring significant additional casualties at a point in the war when their armed forces were
everywhere coming under severe strain.
The other major offensive action to take place in 1916 on the Italian Front was the so-called
Punitive Expedition (Strafexpedition) led by Conrad. During this operation, from May 15 until
June 10, 1916, Conrad opened up an attack on his favored front, from Tyrol, in an effort to
descent from the Alps. The objective was to seize the city of Padua, the major rail point
(head/hub) for the Italian armies at the Isonzo front. In Conrad’s thinking, the chance to cut off
Cadorna’s supply lines to the Isonzo outweighed the logistical issues with moving an army
across the Alps. Boroević had relatively little involvement with Conrad’s offensive, although it
did require him to make sacrifices; he was advised that the offensive would require the transfer
of four of the Fifth Army’s divisions, along with many of its heavy artillery batteries and
supporting troops for the effort – a transfer that Boroević ordered under protest. 161
The Punitive Expedition steadily advanced deeper into Italian territory, aided by Cadorna’s
initial belief that the Austro-Hungarian strike from the Tyrol was merely a feint to distract from
another planned Isonzo offensive. By the end of May, Conrad’s force had advanced fifteen
miles, a third of the way toward Padua. At this point, they encountered resistance from
Cadorna’s reorganized force on the Asiago plateau. By most accounts, the opening of the
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Russian Brusilov Offensive on June 4 heralded the effective end of the Punitive Expedition;
however, the logistical issues involved in supplying an army fighting across the Alps – supply
lines that were by then breaking down – were already forcing an end to the offensive. 162
The end of 1916 saw an event with a major impact affecting the Monarchy, and, indeed,
Boroević himself, as will be seen. On November 21, 1916, following a reign of nearly 68 years,
Emperor Franz Josef died. His successor, the new Kaiser Karl I (1887-1922) proved to be a
complex individual. Much has been written of his handling of the final years of the war and his
desperate attempts to preserve the multinational state he had inherited. At least initially, the new
monarch was, in Pitreich’s words, “greeted sympathetically and without prejudice as the bringer
of a new course to the old rusted system of government.” 163 Karl’s attempt to find a solution to
the nationality problem of the Monarchy was one of the factors that made him work closely with
Boroević.
Already the new monarch had tied himself to Boroević’s image. In a widely circulated photo,
the then Heir Presumptive is seen sitting on a hill alongside Boroević, overlooking troop
movements. The photo was originally printed on the cover of the April 2, 1916 edition of Wiener
Bilder, and has been reprinted in multiple works about the war and the Italian Front. 164
A crucial change for the Italian Front took place as a result of Karl’s accession to the throne,
when in February 1917 the Chief of the General Staff, Conrad, who had often found himself in
conflict with the new Kaiser (and, as well, with Boroević), was removed from his post and
replaced with Arthur Arz von Straussenburg (1857-1935). Conrad was then reassigned to the
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command of an army group in South Tyrol, on the Italian Front; for the remainder of his career
he was to be effectively on a par with Boroević in the command structure.

Boroević Gains Fame – and Notoriety
One of the curious aspects of Boroević’s command on the Isonzo front was the attention it
garnered from the press. While there were certainly other examples of laudatory press accounts
of commanders on other fronts, the accounts of Boroević seemed to take on a remarkable
prominence in newspaper reports, owing to his status as the highest-ranking Croatian officer of
the monarchy, commanding an army fighting over “national” terrain. The Grenzer general’s
fame was becoming known worldwide; the Cuban newspaper Diario de la Marina published a
glowing profile of him during the spring of 1916. 165
Pitreich reported that on March 9, 1917, the journalist Heinrich Friedjung (1851-1920) visited
the front. Pitreich’s remarks about Friedjung’s interactions with Boroević are brief but telling:

The Army Commander [Boroević] used this opportunity to energetically set
himself in a good light as a great commander, but whether Friedjung, as a shrewd judge
of character arrived at a different conclusion, is another question entirely. Accompanying
Friedjung was Dr. [Friedrich] Funder (1872-1959) of the Reichspost, who generally made
a good impression.166

Funder was fated to play a crucial role in reporting Boroević’s later story, as we will see.
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An illuminating view comes from the journalist Alice Schalek (1874-1956), who covered the
Isonzo front for the Viennese paper Neue Freie Presse, and filed a number of accounts from the
front published in 1916 and 1917. In one of her earliest dispatches from the front, Schalek
provided this estimation of Boroević’s character:

There is no need for any intermediary. Anyone can come freely to General von
Boroević and state what they think. And if you ask if you may write about his army,
those eyes, which are still mild, gleam so radiantly that I must now almost smile over my
own fear before this moment.
“If you promised,” [Boroević said] “not to write anything about the Commander, I
would ask you to do so. You have to write about every single soldier. You have to go and
see. Whoever goes there and sees them must tell about them. One can’t do that often
enough! What is happening here on the Isonzo is without precedent in history." 167

Schalek took Boroević’s advice; many of her later dispatches are written through the
viewpoint of junior officers and enlisted soldiers. 168 Schalek’s profile sheds some light on some
of the success that Boroević achieved as a commander, despite his tempestuous relationship with
his command staff. For despite the abrasive attitude (at times bordering on contempt) that he
often assumed when interacting with those in the command structure, he appears to have had a
genuine respect and concern for the welfare of the front-line soldiers under his command,
notwithstanding his penchant for attack and defensive plans that allowed for extremely high
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casualties. The soldiers, for their part, as we will soon see, appear to have reciprocated. As the
next chapter will demonstrate, morale was to remain high until quite late in the war, despite the
setbacks and lack of progress faced by the soldiers on the Italian Front prior to October 1917.
The situation of the Austro-Hungarian forces here compares favorably with that of the Russian
army, which was unable to adjust to reverses on the front and turmoil at home, and quickly
collapsed following the failure of the June 1917 Kerensky Offensive.
Boroevic himself was aware of the need to memorialize the events unfolding around him. In
1916 he approved a proposal for a museum cataloguing the experience of the Monarchy’s
soldiers on the Isonzo, only expressing concern that all of the nationalities at the front be
represented.169
A curious piece is one that appeared in the Berliner Tagblatt on May 20, 1917. Written by a
Viennese soldier in the German army, Otto König (1882-1938), this “Soldatenlied vom Isonzo”
(Soldier’s Song of the Isonzo) paints Boroević in a particularly heroic light:

Boroević von Bojna
Is our General
He came from the Carpathians
And into the Isonzo Valley
“There,” he said, “I will make a strong stand,
You shall not get to Trieste,”
And as he said it, accurate,
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So the Croat kept his word
Yes, yes, Croat,
Who does not shy away from shrapnel or bombs.
And bulletproof,
Yes, bulletproof
He remains to this day.

Boroević von Bojna
Is our General
He commands the seas
Up to the Tolmin Valley.
The Emperor has entrusted him
To skin the little cats
Just like he had done to the Russians
The Iron Croat
Yes, yes, Croat,
Who does not shy away from shrapnel or bombs.
And bulletproof,
Yes, bulletproof
He remains to this day.

Boroević von Bojna
Is our General
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He led us into nine battles
And was successful in them all
There was no man in the whole army
Who did not have the utmost regard for him
Even if he otherwise was a good Christian
And himself wasn’t even Croatian
Yes, yes, Croat,
Who does not shy away from shrapnel or bombs.
And bulletproof,
Yes, bulletproof
He remains to this day.170

This poem’s celebration of both Boroević’s bravery and his ethnicity make it a paean to the
mission of the Habsburg Monarchy, a statement that the kaisertreu Grenzer soldier was the
exemplar to emulate. König was to go on to produce a considerable body of “war poetry”
including a book dedicated to the soldiers on the Isonzo front, Kameraden vom Isonzo
(Comrades of the Isonzo).
There is another curious inclusion in Boroevic’s Nachlass that provides a window into the
esteem in which he was held by his troops. One volume includes the sheet music to two musical
compositions written in honor of Boroevic – “Die Wacht am Isonzo” (“The Watch on the
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Isonzo”), and the “Boroevic March.”171 These were composed by army staff for performance by
the Isonzo Army band. Once again, we can discern a respect for Boroevic on the part of his
troops. The composition of the “Boroevic March” in particular serves as an intentional attempt to
parallel the famous “Radetzky March,” and, by extension, the accomplishments of Field
Marshall Joseph Radetzky (1766-1858), the hero of the Italian wars of 1848-1849. If there had
been any intention for these musical tributes to Boroevic to permeate wider society in the way
that the Radetzky March did, however, it was certainly unsuccessful. While the Radetzky March
continued in regular use for decades following its composition, and is still performed today, there
is no evidence that either of the two pieces composed in tribute to Boroevic were ever performed
outside of the Isonzo front. This is not the only occasion on which a kind of parallel can be
drawn between Boroevic and the “Radetzky March,” as I will discuss in Chapter 5.
Boroević may have enjoyed the respect and at times admiration of the front-line troops;
however, much like during his time on the Eastern Front, he continued to have a tempestuous
relationship with those he worked most closely with, including the staff officers and his
immediate superiors and subordinates. Matters came to a head during the summer of 1915, not
long after the conclusion of the Second Isonzo Battle. In August of that year, a dispute between
Boroević and Alfred Krauss (1862-1938), the General Staff Chief for the Southwest Front, came
perilously close to costing Boroević his command. A disagreement over fortification
construction escalated into a personal conflict between two abrasive personalities, with each in
turn blaming the other for the lack of progress against the enemy on the Isonzo Front.
Commenting on this affair, Schneller opined, “Bosco must go! And it is he of all people, this
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army spoiler, who is being kept on!”172 The dispute escalated to the point where Boroević
tendered a resignation of his commission. The dispute was finally resolved by the intervention of
the official supreme commander of the Habsburg forces, Archduke Friedrich (1856-1936), who
refused to accept Boroević’s resignation and effectively ordered Krauss and Boroević to respect
each other’s prerogatives. The commander of the Italian Front, Archduke Eugen (1863-1954),
added a further note chiding Boroević:

I therefore demand of Your Excellency that, in future, you suppress the inadmissible
sensitivity, which is only detrimental to our great purpose, for which we all wish to do
our utmost, together with the irritability that springs from it, in order to implement my
plans with all your excellent strength, and in so doing, to adapt yourself to this absolutely
necessary hierarchical relationship.173

As we have seen, this was not the first time a member of the ruling family found it necessary
to criticize Boroević's interpersonal skills, as they affected his command style negatively.

“The Son of a Croatian Mother”
Finally, it is illuminating to note the reputation that Boroević was building as a figure among
his fellow South Slavs. Two letters found in Boroević’s Nachlass demonstrate the extent to
which, even early in his command in the Isonzo, he was seen as a national figure. First, a letter
from the Ljubljana City Council of August 6, 1915, granting Boroević honorary citizenship of
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the city, in appreciation of his efforts to protect Slovene lands from the “hereditary enemy.” 174
Likewise, an August 8, 1915 letter from the City Manager of Zagreb offers Boroević
congratulations on his success on engagements on the front, and wishes that he continues to
serve as the instrument of retribution on the former ally who had since become an enemy
threatening their lands. The letter expresses pride that Boroević is “the son of a Croatian
mother,” and assures him that “the entire citizenry of Zagreb receive this occasion with sincerest
congratulations,” – ironic statements considering the fate that was to befall Boroević a few years
later.175
In addition to these plaudits, on February 1, 1916, Boroević was given a distinction that must
have provided him with a great deal of satisfaction, when he was awarded an honorary doctorate
from the University of Zagreb (which, at the time, was known as the Franz Josef University). To
be sure, this honor was likely awarded to Boroević due to his military achievements at the front,
rather than his accomplishments in representing the Croatian people; Archduke Eugen was
awarded the same honor by the University on January 30. 176 This event, however, still appears to
be more nationally charged than it would seem at first glance. Pitreich reported in his account of
the presentation that he perceived a marked anti-Magyar sentiment among the delegation
presenting the honor.177 In addition, the individual tasked with presenting Boroević with the
degree, university rector Franjo Barac, according to one account, took this occasion to attempt to
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get Boroević to definitively “pick a side” in the South Slav question, as we will see in the next
chapter.

More Plaudits, and Caporetto
After the Ninth Isonzo Battle, the onset of winter brought an end to the campaign season until
the next spring. During 1917, Boroević’s command underwent several changes. First, in May of
1917, his Fifth Army was renamed the Isonzo Army. Then, in August, the Isonzo Army was
upgraded to form Army Group Boroević (Heeresgruppe Boroević). This formation consisted of
the First Isonzo Army, commanded by General Wenzel von Wurm, and the Second Isonzo
Army, commanded by Johann Ritter von Henriquez, and Boroević himself became Army Group
Commander. A further reorganization was to follow, probably reflecting the lack of progress at
the front: in January 1918 the order came to convert the Second Isonzo Army into the Sixth
Army, commanded by Archduke Joseph.
The summer of 1917 was to bring another distinction for Boroević, as on June 2, the new
Kaiser Karl I awarded Boroević with the Knight’s Cross of the Military Order of Maria Theresa,
the highest military honor in the Monarchy’s armed forces. 178 For the purposes of the award,
Karl and his wife Zita traveled themselves to the front. During this trip, Emperor and Empress
not only participated in honoring Boroević but also visited with troops in the field and those
convalescing at the local military hospital.179 This visit by the reigning couple to the front
illustrates two themes we have encountered before. First, this was yet another visibility event, in

178

Due to a clerical error, although Karl awarded the Knight’s Cross, the Order of Maria Theresa
itself only recognized Boroevic as having received the Commander’s Cross, a lower rank. The
Order officially awarded Boroevic the Knight’s Cross posthumously in 1931: See Bauer, Löwe,
156-7.
179
Bauer, Löwe, 135-6.
85

which the monarchs attempted to build solidarity with the people. Second, Karl’s offering the
award in person demonstrates how valued Boroević was by the Monarchy, not merely as a
commander, but as a representative of the Croatian people. Karl continued to cultivate this
connection, and maintained an active role in the conduct of the war on the Isonzo front.
The first two engagements of 1917, the Tenth Battle (May 12-June 8) and the Eleventh Battle
(August 18-September 12) both ended in a stalemate. The next battle, however, was another
game changer, one that can be viewed as a reversal of the Sixth Battle the previous year.
This Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo, better known as the Battle of Caporetto, amounted to the
greatest victory by the Habsburg armies on the Italian front, and Fritz Rotter-Le Beau (Aurel’s
grandson) regarded it as one of the most perfect and successful operations of the entire war. 180
As a number of observers have noted, key to the success of Caporetto was the involvement of the
German High Command in its planning and execution. 181 Pitreich, for one, seems to have
welcomed this development. In his diary entry for September 25, 1917, he expresses his
weariness with the tension between Boroević and Le Beau, and his hope that the Germans will
simply take command of the offensive and work out the particulars for themselves. 182 In effect,
to an extent Pitreich got his wish – for although, going into the planning of the offensive,
Boroević had high hopes that he and his army group would play the leading role, tactical and
logistical considerations dictated that the German 14th Army was to be the main wing of the
force leading the attack; Boroević’s Isonzo Army was to play a supportive role in cutting off the
Italian retreat at the Tagliamento River. 183

180

Rotter-Le Beau, Aurel von Le Beau, 124.
Such as Schindler, Isonzo; Thompson, White War; and Mario Morselli, Caporetto, 1917:
Victory or Defeat? (London: F. Cass, 2001).
182
Nachlass Pitreich, B/54, v. 2.
183
Hoffmann, Feldmarschall, 219-28.
181

86

The opening phase of the Battle of Caporetto was an astonishing success for the combined
Austro-Hungarian war effort, even if this triumph was considerably helped by Italian
unpreparedness and refusal to heed warning signs. So convinced was Cadorna that another
offensive would not occur before 1918 that he disregarded warnings from defecting Habsburg
soldiers, and on the morning of October 24 refused to consider the initial shelling as anything
other than a feint.184
Within short order, the allied German-Austro-Hungarian force succeeded in recovering
Gorizia and advanced to occupy Italian territory well south of their original position, ending at
the Piave River. The victory was a huge morale boost for the forces of the Habsburg Monarchy
and a devastating blow for the Italian war effort. Cadorna was relieved of his post on November
8, and replaced as Chief of Staff by Armando Diaz (1861-1928). 185
Virtually all accounts give the major share of the credit for the success of the offensive to the
role played by the German commanders, particularly 14 th Army commander Otto von Below
(1857-1944), while appraisals of Boroević’s leadership during the campaign vary. Schindler does
not say much about Boroević’s performance during the campaign, but highlights his role in
planning the effort.186 Morselli, on the other hand, argues that Boroević was precisely the wrong
commander for the roles assigned to him at Caporetto, and that the failure of his armies to hold
the line at the Tagliamento facilitated the retreat of the Italian 3 rd Army.187 It should be noted,
however, that the Official History maintains that communications and logistical issues led to
Boroević’s army being issued incomplete and contradictory orders by the Southwest Front
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Command.188 Krauss, in his memoir, is likewise critical of Boroević’s performance during the
campaign, particularly his coordination with the German forces – perhaps not surprising given
the bad blood between the two officers! 189
However, although von Below and the German forces certainly deserve the major credit for
the success of the Caporetto campaign, it cannot be ignored that Boroević’s army stood firm, and
fulfilled its expected role during the battle. Indeed, Boroević’s army held its own against a
retreating Italian force that, though demoralized, still proved to be a more effective fighting force
than expected.190 Weather hindered Boroević’s army’s efforts to inflict a decisive defeat on the
Italians, with torrential rains and flooding hindering the movement of Boroević’s troops. 191
Boroević, for his part, felt confident enough about his troops’ performance on the Tagliamento
that he wanted to continue to pursue the Italian forces beyond the river, a position for which he
appeared to receive some support from Archduke Eugen. 192 Ultimately, it seems fair to argue that
although Boroević was not the hero of Caporetto, he certainly did not hinder its success to the
extent that detractors such as Morselli have charged.
When the offensive was finally halted at the beginning of December 1917, the German and
Austro-Hungarian forces had moved the front considerably further south, and were now within
striking distance of Venice. Had the offensive continued to take the city, the blow would very
likely have been enough to force Italy to seek armistice terms. The question should be asked why
the advantage was not pressed; certainly, the German forces at least were strong enough to
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continue the advance at that point, and subsequent observers, such as Morselli, have criticized
them for failing to seize that opportunity. 193 It may have been the case, however, that had Italy
been forced to surrender at that point (i.e., the end of 1917), the Monarchy would have left the
war as well, as its only other antagonist, Russia, was also seeking terms. With Italy removed
from the war (and Serbia by then occupied as well), Austria-Hungary would have had little if
anything to gain from continuing the war effort, effectively giving Kaiser Karl the pretext he was
seeking to remove his forces from the front as well.
At this point, however, it was still necessary for Germany to have the Monarchy stand with it
as an active participant in the war, if only to force diversion of Entente troops from the Western
front to Italy. The imminent arrival of American troops on the Western front underscored the
need to keep as many soldiers fighting on Germany’s side as possible. For these reasons it was
not in Germany’s best interest for Italy to be knocked out of the war at that time, hence the (in
effect, German) decision to halt the offensive short of conquering Venice.
Regardless of this missed opportunity, the combined German-Austro-Hungarian force had
made a huge advance on the Italian front. In addition to recovering Gorizia and atoning for the
loss of the Sixth Battle the previous year, the armies had stabilized the front and dealt their
enemy a humiliating blow. For the moment, Svetozar Boroević, the Lion of the Isonzo, could
rest on his laurels. The signs, at least initially, pointed to 1918 being a good year for the
Monarchy’s war effort.
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CHAPTER 4
FROM VICTORY TO CATASTROPHE

At the beginning of 1918, the Habsburg Monarchy’s borders appeared to be more secure than
at any other time during the war. The victory at Caporetto had secured and expanded the frontier
against Italy. Serbia remained for the moment under occupation, as the Entente was bottled up at
Salonika. The Eastern front was finally safe as the Bolshevik takeover in Russia had led to the
opening of negotiations that soon bore fruit in the Brest-Litovsk treaty.
Within a few months, however, this apparent position of strength proved to be a façade. In
April 1918, the exposure to the world of the Sixtus Affair, a shorthand name for Kaiser Karl’s
attempt to approach the Entente to conclude a separate peace, proved a major embarrassment for
the Monarchy, and the fallout from this incident led to the complete capitulation of Karl and his
government to German leadership in the final half year of the war. Witnessing this development,
the Entente (and their American ally) concluded that the Habsburg Monarchy was now lost to a
German-dominated Mitteleuropa, and after this point, Entente war aims increasingly declined to
seek to preserve the Habsburg state intact in any postwar settlement. While previously US
President Woodrow Wilson and British Prime Minister David Lloyd George had advocated the
preservation of the Monarchy with greater autonomy for the non-German and non-Magyar ethnic
groups within the Habsburg Empire, following the Sixtus Affair, this was no longer the case.
From this point onward, the U.S. and the Entente were to more closely engage with, and provide
greater support to, the Czechoslovak National Committee and the Yugoslav Committee, bodies
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that had as a final goal the dismemberment of the Habsburg Monarchy and establishment of
independent “national” states.
Even amidst the shifting tides of the international scene, however, Boroević may still have
been basking in the plaudits of an honor he had received earlier that year. On February 1, 1918,
he was given a promotion to Field Marshall, the highest rank in the command structure of the
Austro-Hungarian armed forces. As the first (and, in the event, only) individual of South Slav
ethnicity to hold this rank, the symbolism was not lost on observers. In his diary entry on the
event, Pitreich notes

The “first Field Marshall of the Croats,” the Army Group Commander [Boroević], is
beside himself immediately now enjoying the full extent of his new dignity, and the rapid
procurement of the emblems of the office is now his greatest concern; so it has been
decided to assign to him a dedicated Marshall’s command staff. 194

Pitreich’s comment is telling about Boroević’s character and perceptions. In the first place, it
continues a theme that we have seen before, the degree to which Boroević took pride in himself
and his career, at times to the point of vanity. Pitreich’s pithy remarks about Boroević needing
extra command staff and being obsessed with regalia makes one wonder whether he believed that
Boroević were truly deserving of the position, or if he saw it being awarded because his
ethnicity, especially considering the “first Field Marshall of the Croats” statement. In Pitreich’s
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portrayal, Boroević comes off as a kind of caricature, insisting on wearing an overly garish
uniform.

The Piave Offensive
It was against this backdrop, that Boroević’s army was to find itself sorely tested, and pushed
to its limits in the early summer of 1918. Although the Italian front had been relatively stable
since the victory at Caporetto the previous fall, now a new offensive was needed to relieve
pressure on the Western front. By this time, it had become increasingly clear that the German
spring offensive, also referred to as Operation Michael, or the Kaiserschlacht, on the Western
front had stalled, and the arrival of American units was beginning to make an impact on the
Entente war effort. In this threatening scenario, knocking Italy out of the war, if such an outcome
was still possible, now acquired an urgent strategic appeal.
In addition, there was a further reason for the Monarchy’s soldiers to push a renewed drive
into Italian territory during the summer of 1918, owing to the critical shortages in the
provisioning of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces. The Isonzo Army provisioning reports relate
how during the first half of 1918 food supplies for the troops became dangerously low, and
soldiers were forced to subsist on rations that were a fraction of what would normally have been
considered necessary. While in wartime a daily portion of around 3,200 calories was considered
necessary for the average soldier, during the second quarter of 1918 (March-June), the AustroHungarian troops were barely half of that amount (about 1,812 for the Isonzo Army, 1,914 for
the 6th Army).195 Boroević was hardly exaggerating when he laid out the problem in a February
17, 1918, telegram to General Staff Chief Arz:
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Provisioning for the Isonzo Army and 6th Army is extremely critical, and cannot
be postponed, as there are signs of alarming lapses of discipline and exhaustion as a result
of the now four-week starvation period… If the armies are destroyed as a result of
starvation, the hinterland will certainly starve to death, so the answer to this question
cannot be twofold.196

As no help was immediately forthcoming from the High Command (as the Monarchy was
having extreme difficulty feeding both its soldiers and its civilian population), Boroević’s troops
would have to take advantage of another expedient to alleviate its supply problems: the hungry
soldiers were authorized to seize booty, including foodstuffs, from conquered Italian territory. 197
Concern over the desperate condition of their army prompted the High Command to push for
another offensive on the Italian Front in the summer of 1918. The German Empire pressed High
Command to begin the offensive in June, as they were planning an attack on the western front for
one final thrust within the series of offensives that constituted the Kaiserschlacht, and sought to
ensure that Entente troops would be tied down in Italy. 198 This “starvation offensive,” intended to
relieve the supply issues on their troops, would come with its own logistical problems, and had
unintended consequences for the Monarchy’s war effort. It is noteworthy at this stage that, while
Boroević had come up with a plan for an offensive on April 25, 1918, by June he was opposed to
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an offensive taking place at all, having come to the conclusion that the war was no longer
winnable and wanting to preserve the integrity of his army group. 199
The Piave Offensive, the last military operation undertaken under the banner of the Habsburg
Monarchy, opened on June 15, 1918. Boroević’s goal with this offensive was to secure both
banks of the Brenta River and remove the Italians from the Piave shores/plain as quickly as
possible.200 Very early on in the offensive it became clear that Boroević’s army would have to
bear the brunt of the fighting, despite the fact that both Boroević’s and Conrad’s Army Groups
were sent into the battle on equal ranking. 201
Although morale for troops of all nationalities was high going into the early hours of the
offensive, Habsburg forces quickly met with heavy Italian pushback, with Conrad’s Army Group
facing particularly fierce resistance. 202 Boroević’s Isonzo Army fared only marginally better –
the crossing of the Piave incurred heavy casualties inflicted by the 3 rd Italian Army.203 Finally,
with losses mounting, a general withdrawal order was given for Habsburg forces to evacuate to
the east bank of the Piave on June 21, an action that was finally completed by June 23. 204
The Piave Offensive had stalled. The Habsburg war machine had finally, after almost exactly
four years of fighting, run out of gas. Although it had not yet become apparent, the loss of the
war for the Monarchy was now inevitable, and Boroević’s army, as well as the others in the field,
were merely running out the clock.
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The failure of the Piave Offensive was an embarrassment for Boroević; for Conrad, finally, it
meant the end of his career. Conrad’s biographer Lawrence Sondhaus argues that Kaiser Karl
was of the opinion that either Boroević or Conrad had to be made the scapegoat for the loss. In
order to salvage what was left of the honor of the Monarchy’s armed forces, one of the two
generals had to take the blame; the choice naturally fell on Conrad, as firing Boroević would
have meant risking the antagonism of the South Slavs, an outcome which would not have been
acceptable as Karl still needed maintain their loyalty at this critical junction. 205 Therefore,
Conrad was relieved of his command and sent into retirement effective July 15, 1918.

National and Multinational Loyalties
In the aftermath of the Piave offensive, Boroević found himself an unwitting pawn in a
propaganda campaign waged by the Yugoslav National Committee. In mid-July, copies of an
“open letter” to Boroević written by Ante Trumbić (who was soon to play a pivotal role in the
founding of the postwar Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) were dropped over
Habsburg lines by Italian aircraft. The letter, dated June 23, 1918, reads, in part:

Herr General:
I feel compelled, for the development of the whole of humanity in this great and critical
moment to write a few lines to you.
You are today the only one under the Austrian generals whom in the general judgment
of all the allies from a military standpoint is highly esteemed. Into your hands today
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have been placed soldiers who are the sons of our people, and on the ground are facing
brutal military assault. Where are you leading these good and honorable people? For
what are you allowing the blood of our people to be spilled? I cannot believe that you,
such an incredibly talented and capable man, would not know that our people, fighting
in the Austrian army, are dying for German interests.
…
General, you fall into the same error as Ban Jelačić, who rescued Vienna so that his
own people, who he so dearly loved, could be given over to absolutism. This very
moment is more critical than that of the year 1848; today decides the fate of our entire
people. Thousands and thousands of its sons pin their hopes on that great democratic
idea and today fight shoulder to shoulder with their brothers in the Serbian army on the
Salonika Front. In America, troops are being raised among our sons as well, and in a
short time our flags will also fly on the local fronts. Is this not proof that our free people
have no fellowship with the Germans, whether in the form of Austria or in that of a
Mitteleuropa? They will be their own masters in their own house. This sovereign
command I obey and I serve, and I recognize no other sovereign over the will and
interests of my people. The whole people feel confident and know that the victory of
the Entente will mean the liberation and unification of the triune people in the future
State of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. This will simultaneously be the victory of
democracy and progress over the dark Middle Ages with its heavy-handed rule.
General, you have become well-known among our people due to the fight against
the Italians – now is the time to call for a struggle for those greater ideas for which our
allies are fighting. They drive our people into slavery; they use your position to
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completely wipe out our more severely tested people; and instead of being a savior to
your own people, you are driving it to destruction. But Italy is not isolated; it is
supported by the heart and strength of all of its allies and by all of the subjugated
peoples of Austria-Hungary. The young Italian army is facing off against one of the
oldest armies in Europe, but will also defeat it. Italy, in terms of its rebirth, is prepared
to take its worthy place in the circle of great democratic states, which its glorious past
and the uplifting power of its people has made possible for the future for the subjugated
peoples of Austria-Hungary at historic Campidoglio, to express their views and
aspirations for the future before the whole world. The decisions made at Campidogilo
have permeated all of Italy. Therefore, on the part of our subjugation, the present war is
accompanied by a tension, hope, and the most complete conviction on the part of our
people that victory will be on the side of Italy, and that new moral interests, as well as
freedom, will take the place of conservative absolutism.
General! History will not judge you favorably; it examines the actions of the
individual and the totality of struggles, and does so ruthlessly. You have taken the path
which could lead to your name replacing that of Vuk Brankovic in new folk songs.
Would that not be a dreadful verdict for you?
Rome, June 23, 1918
Dr. Ante Trumbić
President of the South Slav Committee in London 206
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The equation of Boroević with Vuk Branković, the Serbian nobleman who supposedly
betrayed Prince Lazar at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, no doubt stung the proud Grenzer. As
will soon become apparent, Boroević would much rather have seen himself in the mold of Josip
Jelačić (1801-1859), the Croatian governor, who, during the 1848 revolutions, sided with the
Habsburg dynasty over the Magyars of the Hungarian government that ruled Croatia, and is to a
large extent credited with helping to protect Habsburg rule during the crisis.
Trumbić’s letter provides an interesting contrast between the dangers of German influence
and what he regards as the benefits of following the Italian example. Trumbić holds up Italy as a
worthy example of a modern democratic state, ignoring inconvenient aspects such as Italy’s own
issues with parliamentary government (Italian governments in the years prior to 1914 had been
notoriously unstable), and its claims on Habsburg lands coveted by South Slavs. 207 In addition,
Trumbić makes reference to Campidoglio (or the Capitoline Hill, one of the Seven Hills of
Rome), which was the seat of government during Roman times, and which Trumbić appears here
to be using as a shorthand for the Italian government, drawing a perhaps ironic parallel to Italy
and its Roman past, forgetting that modern Italy’s attempts to emulate its Roman legacy might
also have problematic implications for the Balkans.
According to another account, however, this had not been the first time that Boroević had
been subjected to an attempt to be drawn into the machinations of Trumbić and the Yugoslav
Committee. The Croatian sculptor Ivan Meštrović (1883-1962), who was active in the Yugoslav
movement during the war, gave the following account in his memoir, Uspomene na Političke
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Ljude I Događje (“Reminiscences of Political People and Events”), of an encounter that occurred
earlier in 1917:

We wanted to shape events to stop our people from continuing to fight the war on the
Italian front. We enlisted the aid of Franjo Barać. He was a good friend of Svetozar
Boroević, Commander of the Austro-Hungarian army on the Italian front. Barać was a
faculty member of the University; he had been the one who had selected Boroević as a
senior doctor at the University, and Barać invited him to receive his honorary degree. There
was no safer way of dealing with Boroević than through this relationship.
At the end of the degree award ceremony, Barać managed to tell Boroević that he needed to
talk with him secretly about an important matter. Boroević spent the night and the
following day at his home. Barać conveyed to Boroević the greetings of the Yugoslav
National Committee, he pointed out that representatives of Committee in Zagreb had been
watching Boroević’s seeming attempts to mirror Jelačić’s career, and warned of the
dangers for the Croatian people of repeating Jelačić’s accomplishments. Barać warned
Boroević that if the Croats were fighting for the emperor, that after the war that everything
would be the same as before. In addition, the representatives of the Committee are
convinced that the war will be lost and that the Croats do not need to save Austria either.
Boroević said that
“They will be encouraged by the Yugoslav Committee in London. They are the people in
the Committee and think best; I just do not believe the Central Powers will lose the war,
and even less that the English and the French will decide to completely liquidate the
Habsburg monarchy. Even if this is to be done, we are fighting for ours here, because what
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would life be for us, were the Italians to take Istria, Dalmatia and Gorica and bring an end
to our most beautiful parts of our life on the sea.”
Barać had told him that this was the message of the Committee, that he, with Boroević,
would have to move to larger units to the Italian side and thus contribute to the federal
victory. Boroević frowned at this and said,
“And my oath of loyalty to the Emperor?”
“And did the emperors not err in their oaths to us?”
“Perhaps you might have a point about that, but let me think about it.”
In the morning, he said verbatim:
“Tell the Yugoslav Committee that … I am prepared to provide my help on the following
two conditions: first, that the Committee and the Serbian government should come to the
Allies, to deny the London Pact and recognize our ethnographic boundaries; and when I
speak in support of the Committee’s goals to hundreds of thousands of people, make it
clear that we are not seen as captives, but as equal partners, and that we can immediately
count on being treated as brothers in any struggle against the Germans.”
The committee could not, of course, agree to any of Boroević's terms, but only suggest that
our people surrender, and trust that in the end everything will be worked out. Boroević’s
condition of denying the London Pact was obviously opposed by the Italians, claiming that
would kill the morale of their troops, if they were to give up the areas they were promised
as a reward for entering the war. Trumbić, of course, would not be able to consider any of
Boroević’s conditions, so everything remained business as usual. 208
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Assuming that Meštrović’s account is to be believed, it does not necessarily serve as evidence
that Boroević’s kaisertreu ethos might have wavered in this case. While he seems to hear his
friend out, he offers continual objection to a number of the points of the Committee’s argument,
and his final response might be viewed as a way of shutting down the conversation by attaching
conditions for his assistance that he was well aware the Committee was incapable of fulfilling.
Boroević’s actions before and after this incident hint toward his belief that the Habsburg
Monarchy remained the best framework for national development for his people, and the proud
Grenzer remained held by his oath of loyalty to the emperor. Boroević was not to earnestly
engage with the Yugoslav Committee until after the Monarchy’s effective authority in the South
Slav lands had ceased. Trumbić and the Yugoslav Committee, however, still attempted to coopt
him, as is evident from the June 1918 letter.
Boroević might have had good reason to fret over the implications of Trumbić’s letter, as it
was one of several ways in which he was unwittingly dragged into the South Slav secession
movement during the summer of 1918. Commenting on press accounts appearing later that
summer that linked Boroević to Croatian secession, Pitreich states the following:

The Croatian Landtag also saw itself compelled to raise the matter in its turn;
there, of course, the person of the Field Marshall was severely affected by the national
issue. This led the Field Marshall to finally fend for himself there by, on July 21,
accompanied by the Ban Dr. Mihailović, making the following address:
“I gather from the journals that in the Sabor there was read a document written by a
completely unknown individual, which contains the indication that I had worked on a
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collusion between the army and the Greater Serbian efforts. I ask Your Excellency in
the Sabor to publicly explain that I pronounce my full contempt for the inventor of this
brainless assertion and his supporters.”
At the same time, in this matter the Field Marshall addressed to the Military
Chancellery of His Majesty the following message:
“I gather from the journals that at the meeting of the Croatian Landtag of July 18 the
Ban had read a document written by a completely unknown individual, which contains
allegations that the former Ban Baron Rauch, the present Vice Ban Dr. Krisković, and I
worked on a collusion between the army and Greater Serbian efforts. I have asked the
Ban to explain publicly in the Landtag that I am giving my fullest contempt to the
inventor of this brainless assertion and his supporters. Reporting this, my fear is for
those who are naïve enough to receive communications from politicians of this
caliber.”209

My research has not turned up any additional accounts of this issue (such as the text of the
document in question, or any other press accounts); however, this brief anecdote illustrates
Boroević’s genuine concern that his loyalty to the Habsburg Monarchy was being called into
question, as demonstrated by the steps he took to assure both the Sabor and the crown of his
loyalty to the Monarchy and his hasty disavowal of the document. While we cannot be
conclusively certain, given what we know about Boroević’s disposition and career, it is highly
unlikely that he was involved in any genuine efforts to separate the South Slav lands from the
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Monarchy (the story related by Meštrović notwithstanding); this was likely another effort similar
to Trumbić’s (perhaps even also at the behest of the Yugoslav Committee) to attempt to coopt
Boroević’s identity to serve their national agenda.

The Unraveling
The remainder of the summer of 1918 continued to be the story of privation for the Isonzo
Army. However, despite the reversals, according to Pitreich, discipline and morale in the army
remained relatively high, and showed no immediate signs of breakdown. 210 The account
provided by LeBeau’s grandson concurs with this assessment: “The catastrophic state on the
home front could not yet break the fighting spirit of the troops at the front; demoralization had
not yet penetrated the front line and remained for the most part at this stage limited.” 211
The month of September 1918, however, was to bring tragedy both for the Monarchy and for
Boroević personally. The month saw the Salonika breakthrough, the unraveling of the war effort
on the South-Eastern front, and the beginning of the end of the war for Austria-Hungary. A
further tragedy was to strike Boroević very hard personally. On September 28, his 17-year-old
son Friedrich, still in military training, had been out late into the night with a group of fellow
cadets and the party was making its way back to the barracks during a heavy storm. While
crossing an old bridge, Friedrich fell through a hole and, despite being a good swimmer, was
carried away by the raging river. His body was not recovered until early November. 212 An
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that they would be held responsible for what had happened to him, initially told their superiors
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October 7 letter to the head of the Kaiser’s Military Chancellery, Egon Zeidler-Daublebsky von
Sterneck (1870-1919), provides a rare window into his emotional state:

… You can imagine how hard this blow has hit me. I am trusting that the loving God
already knows why it had to be this way. I am now one worry poorer, and can devote all
of my mind and aspirations from this time on completely to the interests of His Majesty.
I would not have bothered you with this sad personal affair were there not already signs
that the affair has become known and the danger that an account of the incident will
become known to His Majesty in distorted form. Therefore I am telling you the truth,
along with a request to do what may be necessary to advocate for me and for my poor
son…213

At the very moment that Boroević was grieving the loss of his son, he was also tasked
with having to come to terms with the collapse of the structure of the very institutions upon
which he had based his identity.
September was traumatic for the Monarchy; October was to deal the death blow. The account
given by Le Beau’s grandson maintained that the October 4 German/Austro-Hungarian appeal to
President Wilson for peace terms (on the basis of the Fourteen Points) was made with the
knowledge that the Italians were planning a new offensive, and the Monarchy wanted to end the
war before the attack came, fearing that the outcome of an Italian victory would be devastating
for morale.214 The publication of the October 16 Manifesto by Karl, promising the federalization
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of the Austrian half of the Monarchy, was far too little and far too late a measure to salvage the
situation; in Pitreich’s words, it did nothing but ensure that “the old Habsburg Monarchy expired
in hopeless agony.”215 The Entente, which might have welcomed such a move a year earlier,
ignored this belated half-measure, as did the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Committees, who were
already in the process of working with representatives in Prague, Zagreb, and Belgrade to form
separate independent states. Hungary, viewing the Manifesto as a violation of the terms of the
Ausgleich, effectively declared independence itself. At the front, news of the Manifesto caused
the first major breakdowns of morale. On October 22, Magyar soldiers began to abandon the
front and march home toward Hungary; the next day two Croatian regiments of the 42 nd Honved,
the same division whose valor had been praised by Franz Ferdinand, mutinied and refused to
enter the fighting line.216
Within days, Italy moved to deliver the strike that set into motion the final battle of Svetozar
Boroević’s career, and the Monarchy’s existence. Early on October 24, the Italian army began its
offensive in what was to become known as the Battle of Vittorio Veneto. The date, the
anniversary of the beginning of the Caporetto campaign, was chosen intentionally. The
Monarchy might not have been prepared to fight this last battle, but they were not caught by
surprise. Reports from the Isonzo Army to the Southwest Front Command on October 24 noted
the increase in Italian movements between the Brenta and Piave; although statements from
Italian deserters indicated that the attack was to begin on October 28, they had also received
intelligence that the attack would begin on the 24th.217
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Although the Italian forces now enjoyed considerable numerical superiority over the
Habsburg armies, the troops of the Monarchy fought with great vigor in the initial hours of the
assault, regardless of ethnicity; this situation changed later in the day when an order arrived from
Budapest directing that all Hungarian units (both Honved and Hungarian troops in the Common
Army) evacuate the front in preparation to defend Hungary’s southern frontier. 218 From this point
onward, troop strength and the will to continue the fight declined rapidly. With the Habsburg
forces dwindling and Vienna attempting in vain to secure armistice terms that would save the
Dual Monarchy, fighting on the Isonzo continued for the remainder of October. The Italian
forces continued to occupy the territory that had been contested since 1915, even those parts that
were also being claimed by the newly independent Yugoslav territories; in Gorizia, an Italian
national council and a Slovene national council each claimed rule of the city, agreeing only on a
shared hostility to the Austro-Hungarian troops still in the field. 219 Finally, on October 31, the
Lion of the Isonzo, Svetozar Boroević, abandoned his headquarters at Udine ahead of the
advancing Italian forces, and marched his army toward Carinthia. 220
During the battle itself, the final strands holding the Habsburg Monarchy together came
undone, and the days following Boroević’s departure from Udine was to complete the
dissolution. On October 30, the South Slav territories severed their relationship with the
monarchy, forming a short-lived State of Croats, Serbs and Slovenes that was soon to be joined
to Serbia to create the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The Czechoslovak National
Committee proclaimed the independence of the state of Czechoslovakia. Finally, on November
3, with the Armistice of Villa Giusti, Habsburg forces formally surrendered at the Italian front,
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and its territories, to Italy. All that remained of Kaiser Karl’s inheritance was his GermanAustrian territory, and even that was to be gone within days.

Kaisertreu to the End
In the aftermath of the final battle, Boroević struggled to keep what remained of his army
together, and bring it home. In the interim, he had received word of events that had transpired in
the capital, and had already had a response in mind as to how to react to these events. Friedrich
Funder, the Reichspost correspondent who reported on Boroević at the front, related in his
memoir of a conversation between Boroević and Dr. Adam Hefter (1871-1970), the Prince
Bishop of Klagenfurt, regarding the reason for his melancholy in November 1918. According to
this account, Boroević stated:

Twice I telegraphed His Majesty requesting him to receive me, and twice he had the
same telegram sent back in reply: he would take the first opportunity at a more opportune
moment to thank me for my services. But I did not send these telegrams because I wanted
thanks. Now that everything is over and it’s too late to do anything I can tell you what I
wanted. I wanted to occupy Vienna and to restore freedom of action for the Emperor. But
I could do this only on the Emperor’s direct orders and not on my own initiative. I am not
an Austrian, I was born in Croatia, which today belongs to Yugoslavia. The Austrian
Imperial Field Marshal with the power to act on his own responsibility no longer exists.
Only the express command of the Emperor himself could have authorized me to take this
step. I had everything in readiness. Troops who were not one hundred per cent reliable
had been sent off by rail. I had posted reliable troops at the most important railway
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stations as far as Wiener Neustadt. In twenty-four hours after the receipt of the command
Vienna could have been occupied – and now it’s too late! 221

The telegrams Boroević refers to are included in Pitreich’s Nachlass.222 Here, in this account,
we see what Boroević viewed as his last, best hope to save the Monarchy and make his mark on
history. His intention was to mirror the actions of another famous Croatian, Josip Jelačić, whose
bold actions had helped to save the Habsburg Monarchy from the turmoil that it had faced in
1848. He had already sensed that he could be the one to take bold action if the situation on the
home front deteriorated. Earlier that summer, writing to his friend Franz von Bolgar about a
meeting with the Kaiser, Boroević remarked, “the questions that threaten our lives are, in my
opinion, only to be solved by a strong, gifted, independent personality; this convinces the Crown
that it is more important to them to find useful guides than provable exponents.” 223
What were these momentous actions that Boroević sought to recreate? At first glance, one
might see that some parallels that could be drawn with the situation that existed during the fall of
1918 and the crisis the Austrian Empire faced in 1848 and 1849, in which at times it seemed the
state’s very survival was in question, particularly when the Hungarian government declared
independence in early 1849. It was at this point where Josip Jelačić, while advocating for the
Croatian people, also made it clear that he was a loyal servant of the Habsburg dynasty. 224
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There has been relatively little scholarship devoted to Jelačić. The only English language
biography produced about him is over a century old: M. Hartley, The Man Who Saved Austria:
The Life and Times of Baron Jellacic (London: Mills & Boon, 1912). The most reliable and
accessible biography (for those who read German) is Walter Goerlitz, Jelačić: Symbol für
Kroatien (Vienna: Amalthea, 1992). As can be expected, works in Croatian are comparatively
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Jelačić was selected by the Croatian Sabor to the office of Ban in March of 1848, over the
objections of the ruling Hungarian authorities, with whom he immediately came into conflict
over the longstanding Magyarization policies pursued in Croatia along with other lands of the
Crown of St. Stephen. By May of 1848, Jelačić was appealing directly to the court in Vienna:

I can say that I stand, hurt almost to death, before the Eternal Imperial-Royal
Majesty, a man who faithfully and honestly serves Austria and its illustrious dynasty…
Should all others have their freedom, and only we Croats and Slavonians then be exposed
to the arbitrariness of a Magyarizing ministry? 225

As the events of 1848 continued to unfold, and Hungary under Lajos Kossuth moved further
in its demands for greater autonomy, and then independence, Jelačić was forced to choose a side,
one that was necessarily to place him at odds with the government in Budapest that was his
nominal overlord, but was increasingly pursuing policies counter to those in the interest of his
people. By July of 1848, Jelačić declared to the Saxon ambassador Count Vitzthum, “So long as
this head remains on my shoulders, I will not allow Hungary to magyarize us.” 226
Throughout the remainder of 1848 and 1849 Jelačić worked not only to advocate for Croatia
but also for the dynasty. He faced also the uphill battle of serving a state that, until December
1848 when Ferdinand I abdicated in favor of Franz Josef, lacked a competent monarch. As a
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result, he often had to act without any clear direction from the crown, as occurred in October
1848, when he brought troops to Vienna to quell revolution and protect the imperial family – the
very same action Boroević attempted to replicate in 1918. Following the Hungarian declaration
of independence Jelačić continued to fight the Magyar forces in service to the Emperor, until the
revolt was finally ended in mid-1849.
Although Jelačić is remembered for his actions to protect the interests of the Croatian people
and for his loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty during the crises of 1848 and 1849, there is a
postscript to the story that Boroević would have just as soon forgotten, the precise one that
Trumbić pointed out in his letter. Jelačić remained Ban until his death in 1859, but he was forced
after 1849 to implement the policies of a reactionary government in Vienna. It opted not only to
punish rebellious Hungary with the loss of what remained of its regional autonomy to a
centralized government, but also to subject this same treatment to the provinces that had been
loyal to the dynasty, including Croatia. In addition, the Magyarization policies of years past were
replaced with Germanization policies, which Jelačić was pressured to implement. Despite this
less than favorable outcome, the role that Jelačić played in the resolution of the existential crisis
of 1848, as well as the generally favorable role that Jelačić still held in Croatian memory
(demonstrated by the statue in Zagreb’s Jelačić Square) ensured that the Ban’s actions provided a
blueprint for Boroević to attempt to follow in 1918.
But 1918 was not 1848. In 1848, though the situation was dire, time and momentum were still
on the side of the regime. Although, with the exception of the Magyars, a few self-proclaimed
leaders of the empire’s national groups wished for greater autonomy, they remained steadfastly
loyal to the dynasty throughout the conflict. By October 1918, conditions had deteriorated to the
point where nothing was really salvageable. Karl may well have known or suspected what
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Boroević’s intention was, and sent his response as a diplomatic “thanks, but no thanks.” Funder
believed this was the case, as he states that Karl, knowing that the situation was beyond saving,
saw no reason to attempt to try to use force in a vain attempt to hold it together. 227 For his part
Boroević, as much as he sought to emulate Jelačić, fell short in one key respect; when push came
to shove, unlike his predecessor, the Field Marshall would not take action without, or contrary to,
an express order from his monarch.
As the pieces of the empire had collapsed, in Vienna Karl had surrendered to the inevitable.
On November 11, 1918, he issued a proclamation releasing his officers from their oaths of
loyalty to him, and relinquished his participation in the Austrian government. A corresponding
proclamation for Hungary followed on November 13. While this statement has widely been
construed as an abdication, Karl deliberately avoided a formal abdication to in order to leave
open the possibility of an eventual restoration (as he attempted in Hungary in 1921). Karl and his
family were ultimately exiled from postwar Austria.
With his last bold gambit failed, Boroević had nothing more to do than to bring what
remained of his army back into Austrian territory, where they then dispersed. Upon the
completion of this action, his career officially came to an end, along with the state system to
which it was so inextricably tied. And yet, as pondered his next move, he reasoned, at 61 years
old, he still had something of value to bring to the table. Therefore, he approached the
government of the newly forming Yugoslav state and offered them his services. The new
Yugoslav state, would, after all, have need of experienced military talent. At that very moment
the young state was engaged in a struggle against the Italian government over claims to
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territories in Dalmatia and Istria. Should it become necessary to resort to military action to
defend South Slav rights to these territories against Italian encroachment, certainly the leaders in
Belgrade and Zagreb would want to take advantage of what Boroević could provide them!
In such a frame of mind, Boroević made his appeal to the governments in Zagreb and
Belgrade, likely confident that it would be accepted. Little did he realize that the year 1918 was
not yet finished with turning his life upside down.

Fig. 5, Schönbrunn Palace, the location where Karl issued his October Manifesto and the
November 11, 1918 resignation from the government of Austria. (Photo taken by author)
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CHAPTER 5
THE SOLDIER WITHOUT A COUNTRY

When Svetozar Boroević sent his petition offering his military expertise to the newly forming
Yugoslav government, he was confident that it would be accepted. He had even sent two officers
to Zagreb to prepare for his arrival home. 228 He was likely shocked and dismayed, then, when the
response he received declined his services. Moreover, Boroević was refused citizenship within
the borders of the new state, or to even return to his home as his place of residence. To add
further hardship, Boroević’s luggage, containing many of his personal effects, had been detained
and ultimately confiscated by the Slovene National Council en route from the front, and, as we
will see, Boroević was never able to persuade the Yugoslav government to return it. 229
What was the Yugoslav government's reasoning behind the banishment? Boroević biographer
Eduard Hoffmann traces much of the resentment felt by the National Councils toward Boroević
to an incident that occurred in early November 1918, as the remnants of the Isonzo Army were
making their way back from the front. Initially, the Slovene National Council in Ljubljana was
not permitting the army to pass through its territory on its way back into the German Austrian
lands, prompting a heated exchange between Boroević (along with his 1 st Isonzo Army
commander Wenzel von Wurm [1859-1921]), and the members of the National Council.
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Although the army was subsequently permitted access, it caused some bad blood between
Boroević and the Slovenian leadership, and was a crucial moment according to Hoffmann. 230
In the chaos surrounding the collapse of Habsburg authority in the South Slav territories, the
Slovene and Croatian National Councils briefly served as the governing authorities for the
region. These bodies, which had during the war worked for independence for their national
groups in tandem with Trumbić’s Yugoslav Committee231, declared the independence of their
provinces with the intention of unifying them with the Serbia to create a united South Slav
federation. Several of the leaders of the National Councils, such as Anton Koroseć (1872-1940),
were to go on to serve, if briefly, in the Yugoslav government.
Boroević’s confrontation with the National Council was the occasion for one of the most
strident expressions of his identity to come out of his last years. He pleaded with the
representatives:

Not as a general and not as the last son of my country, but as a patriot, who loves his
homeland at least as much as any other Croat, I point out the consequences which will
inevitably come. I’m appealing to the patriotism of the National Council to do everything in
its power to ensure that the armies do not degenerate into hordes, destroying these new
foundations.232
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In Boroević’s statement we can detect a concern for the welfare of both the soldiers under
his command as well as the state of his country that is sincere, even if on some level it may also
be intermingled with a desire to protect his own legacy. The term he uses, “homeland” (German
Heimat) may be a little vague in its meaning, though here Boroević can be almost certainly
understood to mean the Croatian territories, under whatever government now exerted its
authority there.
It should be noted, however, that other observers mitigate or downplay the impact of this
incident; some, such as Bauer, believe that it was of little consequence and had been mostly
forgotten by the time the decision had been made to exclude Boroević. 233 These scholars’
argument has the force of logic. When the decision was made to banish Boroević, the Yugoslav
government might instead have been considering the general pattern of his career. Could an
officer who had spent his entire career defending the Dual Monarchy now serve another master
as loyally? Many among the South Slav national councils did not believe so, particularly for a
prominent figure such as Boroević. Indeed, the current version of the Croatian Biographical
Lexicon states that Boroević was turned away from the Yugoslav state out of suspicion that his
loyalties were still with the Habsburg dynasty and the Austro-Hungarian empire. 234 On some
level this suggests their belief that Boroević’s profession of his loyalty to the Croatian people,
given in the quote above, was insincere, that he was, essentially, telling them what they wanted
to hear. Given the general pattern of Boroević’s life and career, however, this is highly unlikely.
Rather, it was the case that Boroević maintained both complete loyalty to his people as well as to
the construct of the Habsburg Monarchy (at least, until the latter no longer existed). The account
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provided in the next paragraph provides further support for this view. The final tragedy was that
Boroević’s fate was decided by nationalist leaders of the new Yugoslavia, for whom such dual
loyalty simply was not possible.
Another possible factor to consider is whether the Yugoslav government suspected Boroević
of any authoritarian aspirations. Already recent memory had provided the example of the
attempted coup against the Russian Provisional Government by General Lavr Kornilov in
September 1917, and the interwar period was soon to see the establishment of effective military
dictatorships in several other eastern European states: Horthy in Hungary, Antonescu in
Romania, Pilsudski in Poland. Although no evidence has yet surfaced indicating that Yugoslav
leaders had specific fears about Boroević following this authoritarian mold, it is possible the
thought of a former high-ranking South Slav officer of the Dual Monarchy, who still had some
degree of name recognition and popularity at that time, seeking more than just a job with the new
government might have occurred to them. For Boroević, however, there is no evidence that he
would ever have been interested in seizing power for himself, though if some of his
correspondence regarding military discipline were known to the Yugoslav government, such as
his letter to Sarkotić, it might have fueled any suspicions. 235
An account given by Prince Alois Schönburg-Hartenstein (1858-1944), former commander of
the Sixth Army, sheds some light on Boroević’s emotional state at this point:
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During a solitary walk in the woods I met Boroević and his wife. He kept his
proud attitude and told me what he was thinking of doing: “The Croatian nation has
produced only one Field Marshall, which I am. They have banished me.” 236

Even now, Boroević took pride in the accomplishments of his military career; however, the
rejection by his people stung him bitterly, and in this brief statement we can see that it took some
toll on his self-esteem.
What are we to make of the draconian attitude that the Yugoslav government took toward
Boroević? It is perhaps illuminating to compare Boroević’s experience to those of two other
South Slav officers within the Monarchy, Gregor Edler von Miscević and Stefan Sarkotić. Like
Boroević, Miscević and Sarkotić were Serbo-Croatian by ethnicity (and would today be
considered Serbian as a result of their Orthodox faith) and came from similar Grenzer
backgrounds. Both men, like Boroević, ended their lives not in the South Slav lands but in
German Austria.
Miscević (1854-1937) came from an Orthodox family in a village of the town of Novska,
close to the modern Bosnian border. Miscević entered the military academy at an early age and
ultimately entered the officer corps, seeing a career trajectory somewhat similar to Boroević,
though he did not rise through the ranks as quickly. In 1908 he married a German woman and
had three daughters. The outbreak of war in 1914 saw him assigned to the Sixth Corps of the
Fourth Army, under Boroević’s command. At the end of the monarchy in 1918 he had reached
the rank of Lt. Field Marshall. As for Miscević’s fate after the war, his memoir indicates that he
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and his family voluntarily took up residence in Vienna after the war, where he spent the
remainder of his life (Miscević writes about having chosen Austrian citizenship and discharging
his community responsibilities in Novska). 237 For Miscević, this may have been an easy decision
to make due to his marriage, though one wonders if he would have been permitted to return to
Yugoslavia had he wished.
Another relevant experience comes to us through the lens of the experience of Stefan
Sarkotić (1858-1939). Like Boroević and Miscević, Sarkotić was from a Grenzer family, of
Orthodox religion and Serbo-Croatian ethnicity, born in the town of Sinać. 238 He also entered the
military academy at an early age and joined the officer corps. Following postings throughout the
monarchy, he ultimately succeeded Boroević as commander of the 42 nd Honved Army in Zagreb,
the position he found himself in at the outbreak of war in 1914. It was at this point (December
1914) that the Austro-German Oskar Potiorek’s failed campaign against Serbia led to the latter’s
removal from office as Governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina, after which the office was conferred
upon Sarkotić, in a move that was undoubtedly somewhat politically inspired (having an ethnic
German replaced by a southern Slav Grenzer). This role suited him as, although he was of a
similar Grenzer mentality, Sarkotić was more politically engaged than Boroević, and his name
was even floated as a possible successor as Chief of the General Staff following Conrad’s
removal in 1917.239 From his position as governor, however, Sarkotić did have some input into
the national issue; in 1915 he sent a report to Emperor Franz Josef urging the union of the five
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“historic” Croatian territories (Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina) into a single
autonomous entity – essentially, a form of the “trialist” solution. Sarkotić continued to pursue
this idea with Franz Josef’s successor. 240 Sarkotić continued as Governor until the end of the
Monarchy in 1918.
However, as Sarkotić was residing within the boundaries of the new Yugoslav state, he was
soon imprisoned by officials of the Yugoslav government as a potential enemy of the state for his
visible connection to the previous regime, as well as having previously voiced objections to
Serbian leadership of the new state (which in some respects seems evident from his blueprint for
the trialist territory, having left out Serbia). Upon his release from prison, Sarkotić, like
Boroević, was banished from Yugoslavia, and forced to take up residence in the Austrian state.
He settled in Vienna and spent the remainder of his life there, writing in support of émigré
Croatian separatist movements.
The Yugoslav government’s treatment of both Boroević and Sarkotić sheds light on another
possible motivation for their exclusion. The Serbian leaders in Belgrade had reason to distrust
the two men not only due to their standing in the Monarchy’s officer corps, and their continued
loyalty to that construct to the very end, but also because they both were Orthodox believers who
appeared to identify more closely with Croatia than with Serbia. In the eyes of Belgrade, they
had already violated the expected norm (common though not quite universal by the early decades
of the twentieth century) that Orthodox South Slavs were to identify as Serbs and align with
Serbian national interests. Belgrade’s disdain for the two Grenzer officers stemmed from a sense
that they were seen as traitors and a fear that they could serve as focal points for Croatian
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opposition to the new state, which was already forming as a result of the work of politicians such
as Stjepan Radić. As we have seen, in the case of Sarkotić, this fear had some justification.
Boroević, Miscević, and Sarkotić, in taking up residence in postwar Austria, found
themselves in a continued state of uneasiness with regard to their nationality and citizenship
within the new state, being now among the many “displaced people” of the interwar period.
Under the Treaty of St. Germain, while ethnic Germans and German speakers from throughout
the lands of the former Dual Monarchy could obtain citizenship within the new Austrian
republic, those of other nationalities were largely left in a state of legal limbo. Key to the
interwar concept of citizenship in Austria was the principle of Heimatrecht, the right of domicile.
According to some interpretations of Austrian citizenship law, Heimatrecht, and Austrian
citizenship, was allowed to those who had “completely adapted to Austrian conditions in one’s
family and civic life.”241 Certainly Miscević would have met this criterion, and the argument
could be made that Boroević and Sarkotić, by virtue of their service in the officer corps, would
be afforded the same privilege. In the event, it was this very association that was to tip the scales
toward inclusion in postwar Austria for the South Slav officers; Rudolf Kiszling makes a telling
comment by noting that Sarkotić “belonged among the best representatives of western, Germanrooted Croatian culture.”242 As we will soon see, similar comments were also made regarding
Boroević. In a sense, Sarkotic (as well as Boroević and Miscevic) “passed” because he behaved
in a more “civilized” (read, “more German-like”) fashion, that distinguished him from the (in the
eyes of some German nationalists, whose rhetoric acquired an increasingly extremist tone after
1918) “boorish” manners of most South Slavs. Though the South Slav officers were ultimately
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granted legal residence in postwar Austria, their fate was to live apart from the population, never
truly fitting in. Certainly Boroević felt this sense of alienation, as seen by his statement to Dr.
Hefter.243
How justified was this sense of alienation that Boroević felt? After all, he had made a career
in a polyglot empire, one that had shaped and accommodated not only Karl Lueger and Adolf
Hitler, but also Sigmund Freud and Karl Kraus. However, within this milieu, he would still have
detected the sense of Austro-German cultural superiority to which he had earlier been exposed
by the likes of Conrad and Schneller, when his sense of devotion and striving to get ahead would
have impelled him to overlook it. Now, with his career gone, and left in a state comprised almost
entirely of ethnic German populations, he could no longer pretend that being an “outsider” did
not impact him.
An intriguing parallel to Boroević’s case can be drawn from literature, in the form of Joseph
Roth’s 1932 novel Radetzky March. The story follows several generations of the Trotta family, a
family of Slovene origin (fittingly, for our purposes), whose patriarch, an officer in the Kaiser’s
service, is granted a title of high nobility and becomes a recipient of the highest favor for having
saved the Emperor’s life on the battlefield at the Battle of Solferino (1859). This individual,
having embraced his new title, actively discourages his son (for whom he has arranged the
pursuit of a career as a district official) from having any connection to their family or ethnic
roots. Finally, the grandson, Carl Joseph, seeks a career as a cavalry officer, which encompasses
a range of experiences representative of the officer corps of the Monarchy until he meets his end
during an engagement on the Eastern Front at the outset of the First World War. Carl Joseph’s
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grieving father dies on the same day as Franz Joseph, and mourners at his funeral remark that the
two could not have survived each other, and neither could survive old Austria. 244
Several elements of Roth’s narrative have parallels to Boroević’s case. While Boroević might
not necessarily have seen himself in the character of the first Baron von Trotta, who felt the need
to downplay his own Slovene heritage, disassociate himself from his family, and embrace a more
“imperial” national identity, he was to have this fate thrust upon him, by both contemporaries
and some of those memorializing him. Some of the stubbornness of Baron von Trotta’s
personality, however, would hit closer to home for Boroević (again, whether he would have been
cognizant of this or not is another matter). In one instance, Baron von Trotta so heavily objects to
an account in a history book which states that he was a cavalry officer, rather than the infantry
officer that he was, that he demands that the entire account of his deed be removed from the
textbook, rather than for the single factual inaccuracy to be printed. 245 It is not difficult to
imagine someone such as Boroević insisting on such a minor point of honor. In a similar manner,
Carl Joseph, like Boroević, remains kaisertreu to the end, though he, and his family, ultimately
pays a dear price, when no Kaiser remained to whom he could be loyal.
While Boroević was adjusting to the transition of his forced retirement, the lands that his
army had contested along the Isonzo front learned their fate. Most of the Istrian peninsula (an
area with a mostly Slovene population), including the prized city of Trieste, was awarded to Italy
in the peace settlement. Italy was, however, initially denied its desired gains of Fiume (Rijeka)
and the Dalmatian coastline. The former was to be annexed as a result of the nationalist
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expedition led by Gabriele d’Annunzio in 1919; the latter occupied during the Second World
War. Istria, save for Trieste, was to be turned over to Yugoslavia after 1945.

A Loyal Croatian
From his retirement, Boroević made some further attempts to engage with the Yugoslav
government, and to gain at least some kind of reversal of the verdict that had been passed against
him at the end of the war. While these efforts were fruitless, they warrant mention for two
reasons; first, they represent a final attempt by Boroević to claim for himself an identity as a
loyal member of the Croatian people, and second, they are noteworthy due to the intermediary
Boroević chose – his former adjutant, fellow Croat Slavko Kvaternik (1878-1947). In a letter to
Kvaternik in early 1919, Boroević asks him to keep him informed of events in Croatia, and asks
for his help in publishing a work presenting “his side of the story” and his conduct during the
war.246 In a January 11, 1920 letter to Kvaternik, Boroević’s requests become more explicit, at
points painfully so:

I still do not believe in the good intentions of the Belgrade government. As time
goes on, I’m more convinced. Good intentions quickly fade. The public forgets me. Other
events are occurring. While some remember me in the right way, I will probably be
buried, and then I do not need more. But since you are again traveling to Ljubljana to talk
about the confiscated items, please also confer with Zerjav, Jeglić, and of course the
secretary of the commission; say the following on my behalf that neither Beć nor
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Belgrade will reply to my pension requests; my savings bonds have been blocked in
Hungary and I can’t get any interest because I am Yugoslav; my wife is ill and I live in a
miserable house. I do not require charity, just what I am owed. I’m appealing to them not
to turn me away in anger but to help me before it’s too late. Tell them that, and with the
best of my will – I cannot live anymore!247

Boroević’s reference to the “Belgrade government” here is a telling slip. Recall that the pre1914 Serbian government had been based in Belgrade, and many of its leaders (King Peter,
Nikola Pasić) were directing this new Yugoslav government. It is a strong hint that these
individuals are who Boroević holds responsible for his exclusion from the Yugoslav lands and
his subsequent misfortune. Although the hopelessness of his situation came through in letters like
these (another example of which appears again shortly), Boroević was capable of a kind of
guarded optimism. A letter to Kvaternik of April 23, 1920 (exactly a month before Boroević’s
death), discusses Boroević’s intention to appeal to be able to return to Croatia, and some hope of
finding a sympathetic ear to his plea, though knowing the odds were against him. 248 Through all
of Boroević’s correspondence, he would have had no way of knowing that, within a few years,
his protégé Slavko Kvaternik was fated to be one of the founders of the Ustaše Party, the
Croatian fascist movement that was to take control of Croatia during the Second World War and
carry out a genocidal campaign against the Serbian population living in the area occupied by the
short-lived (and Nazi-supported) Independent State of Croatia; this massacre claimed the lives of
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tens of thousands of Serbs and negatively impacted relations between Serbs and Croats for
decades afterward.
The remaining months of Boroević’s life were spent in poverty, with the former Field
Marshall and his wife occupying sparse quarters in Klagenfurt, Carinthia, in southern Austria.
Here, one last time, a border area was to play a role, if tangential, in Boroević’s life. The choice
of Carinthia as a place for Boroević to live might have been largely dictated by economic factors,
but its location in the south of the new Austrian state, close to the border with the Slovene area of
the Yugoslav state, may well have been part of the equation. Had Boroević followed the example
set by Miscević and Sarkotić and settled in Vienna, he might have gained additional support
from the Austrian government. Instead, his settling in Klagenfurt speaks to a desire to be close to
the South Slav territories to facilitate a return in the event that the political winds should enable it
to happen. This borderland influence, however, was to differ from the others in one crucial
respect; this time, he lived as a South Slav in territory that was almost entirely populated by
ethnic Germans.
Financial woes were to occupy much of Boroević’s attention during these last months. He and
his wife were supported only by a small pension provided by the Order of Maria Theresa. On
February 5, 1920, he wrote the following to his friend, Franz von Bolgar (1851-1923):

Today I come with a request, the fulfilment of which has become a major life
question for me. It is well known to you that my return home is not allowed, because I
would not follow certain leaders’ orders. I could have broken my oath to fulfill the wishes
of these people; I of course did not. Ljubljana has seized my private luggage on the train
and it disappeared totally, so that I was left almost naked there after demobilization. My
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request for the handing over of my pension has so far from Vienna and elsewhere gotten
no response. My savings, placed in Hungarian war bonds, as well as the deposits of my
wife in Austrian pensions carry no brighter interest; these have both been blocked. So I'm
left totally penniless and living well over a year by incurring debt, which I of course can’t
continue. My request is now that you should sell off those assets of mine you can get
access to provide me with my deposit. You should sell it regardless if I suffer a great loss.
I can't accept that someone such as you would forget me despite of all the newspaper lies,
that I should starve before you help me.249

I have not been able to determine what it was that Boroević asked Bolgar to sell, or if the
request proved to aid Boroević’s financial situation. On May 23, 1920, Boroević suffered a
stroke following a morning swimming exercise, which quickly proved fatal. While I am unaware
of records that would give a more precise picture of Boroević’s physical condition in his last
days (i.e., surviving medical records) it is not unreasonable to speculate that the last several years
of his life were likely marked by declining health due to several factors. The stresses of the war
had taken a considerable toll on him, particularly the last year; not only had he had to contend
with the planning, execution and fallout of unsuccessful engagements, but it is likely that he
shared at to at least some extent with the privations that the soldiers at the front experienced
during those last months. In addition, the considerable trauma he faced during the fall of 1918 –
the loss of his son, the collapse of the Monarchy and his place within it, the rejection by his own
people – left a deep gash on his psyche, which could well have sapped his will to continue,

249

Neue Freie Presse, January 27, 1929, p. 5
127

especially knowing that, at 63, his chances for further martial glory were likely over. Finally, the
greatly reduced financial circumstances he found himself in after the war increased his anxiety
and likely contributed to his failing health. These factors may have been at play on that morning
when his normal exercise routine ended in tragedy.
Boroević was provisionally buried in Klagenfurt, though his remains were within months
moved to Vienna’s Central Cemetery and interred in a tomb in the New Arcades, paid for by the
former Kaiser Karl (himself still in exile and unable to pay his respects in person). In this tomb
were also interred the remains of Boroević’s son Friedrich, as well as his wife Leontine upon her
passing in 1963. The interment site is in a place of honor, located next to the stately cemetery
Church of St. Charles Borromeo, 250 and just in front of the tomb stands the courtyard reserved
for the burials of the leaders of postwar Austria, including Karl Renner (1870-1950), the great
Social Democratic theoretician who before 1914 had tried with Otto Bauer to find a viable
solution to the nationality problem in Austria-Hungary, and later played a leading role in
establishing both the First and Second Austrian republics. 251

Boroević and Memory
An unsigned eulogy in Boroević’s Nachlass (the author only identifies himself as having been
a soldier on the Isonzo who had served as a valet to Boroević), lionizes the fallen hero and rages
against his fate:
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The whole force of this tragedy, and the vile ingratitude that was directed at you,
brought you low prematurely. That is fate!
History has yet to speak the last word about this tragedy, about what you and we have
fought for and suffered with you, about the legacy of your command. With a raised hand
and a clear conscience, soldiers can look forward to the verdict of history. 252

Boroević’s obituary in the Viennese paper Neue Freie Presse opined that “often his name
would be spoken in tones full of admiration and fanatical confidence, and then in a sense of
rejection, which would increase to passionate hatred.”253 In a sense, this sentiment encapsulates
elements of not only the last years of Boroević’s life, but also the limited efforts since his death
to interact with his memory. The same obituary, for example, while lauding his
accomplishments, makes note of the rumor at the outbreak of the war that implicated Boroević in
a plot to betray the Monarchy to Serbia. 254
Almost a decade later, in 1929, the same paper was to revisit the subject of Boroević, on the
occasion of the publication of Archduke Josef’s memoir. In this case, the paper published
extracts from a series of letters from Boroević to his friend Franz von Bolgar. The portrait it
paints of Boroević is a generally positive one; it lauds him as a “hero,” though at times he comes
off as petty or self-justifying – one of the letters details Boroević’s writing to Archduke Eugen to
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resign his commission during the summer of 1915 (as a result of the conflict with Krauss),
though curiously, no details are here included as to why. 255
Likewise, his memory was to become a source of contestation among veterans of the AustroHungarian armed forces and their successors. A biographical account of the members of the
Order of Maria Theresa published in 1943 has a telling entry on Svetozar Boroević. This work
states that, following the end of the Monarchy and the establishment of the Yugoslav state,
Boroević chose to live in Klagenfurt; without providing any discussion of his banishment from
the South Slav territories, it is implied that his choice was a free one, as in the case of
Miscević.256 It is perhaps significant that this account belongs to the Second World War period, a
time when the author might have had a particular agenda in emphasizing Boroević’s service to
the Monarchy and downplaying his South Slav nationality. By contrast, there is the account from
an early edition of the Neue Österreichische Biographie (New Austrian Biography), published in
1923. The entry on Boroević, written by Edmund Glaise-Horstenau (1882-1946), who was the
general editor of the Official History of the war, does discuss Boroević’s exile from the
Yugoslav state and the circumstances surrounding it, and in general devotes more discussion to
the issue of his nationality than in the Order of Maria Theresa entry. However, even with this
entry, Glaise-Horstenau makes it a point to discuss Boroević’s excellent command of the
German language.257 In effect, Boroević is being adopted as an honorary ethnic German, thus
deserving of citizenship and other rights from the Austrian state. As with the citizenship issue
discussed earlier, the ethnic and racial issue enters into the discussion – Boroević is worthy of
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being remembered because in his service to the Monarchy he transcended his ethnic origins and
acculturated himself to the norms of the Austrian Germans who were the rulers of the former
state and the guardians of its legacy.
But how did Boroević’s memory fare during the years after 1945? In one sense it would seem
that the figure of Boroević, with his dual Serb-Croatian identity, would make an ideal candidate
to be put into the service of Josip Broz Tito’s program of “brotherhood and unity” in an attempt
to create a closer union among the ethnic groups among whom he attempted to create a shared
“Yugoslav” affiliation. During Tito’s rule, however, Boroević’s memory does not figure at all;
one prominent historian of the Balkans, Jože Pirjeveć, reasons that Boroević was generally
forgotten during this era simply because the memory of the Second World War so completely
overshadowed that of the First.258 The argument can also be made that, in addition, the figure of
Boroević proved problematic to fit into a Communist narrative, given his high rank within the
officer corps of the Habsburg Monarchy and the fact that he had been awarded a noble title.
Svetozar Boroević’s hometown of Umetić and the region surrounding it was fated to continue
to be a site of national contestation through the remainder of the twentieth century. As a region
of the Croatian Yugoslav republic that was populated by Serbs, it was drawn into the chaos of
the wars accompanying the collapse of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. When Croatia declared its
independence in 1992, much of the region encompassing the old Military Frontier was occupied
by Serb separatist forces, leading to the establishment of the Republic of Serb Krajina, protected
by Slobodan Milosević’s Yugoslav army. War in this territory continued until 1995. As a result
of the war and its aftermath, the majority of the prewar Serb population fled the country. Today,
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(as of a 2011 census) the border county of Sisak-Moslavina has a population of 172,439 – almost
entirely Croatian; the small town of Umetić has a population of 73. 259
Oddly, it is only in more recent years that the memory of Svetozar Boroević has come to be
called upon again. While some scholarship has occurred in Croatia in the years since the 1990s,
it is in neighboring Slovenia where both memorialization to Boroević and the publication of
biographical works about him have been more numerous, likely owing to the physical connection
of the Slovene lands to the fighting on the Isonzo (Soča) front a century ago. 260 It is in Slovenia
also where the most visible actions have been taken to honor Boroević. For example, in May
2009, the Ljubljana city council voted to restore Boroević’s honorary citizenship of the city,
which had been stripped from him during the events leading to his exile from the Yugoslav
territories.261 Most recently, the city of Nova Gorica (i.e., the part of Gorizia on the Slovene side
of the border) dedicated a monument to the memory of Svetozar Boroević in December 2016. 262
It is likely that more such events will occur to commemorate the end of the war and the
anniversary of Boroević’s death. Quite possibly, those involved in any forthcoming
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retrospectives on Boroević’s legacy might evaluate his character in terms similar to those with
which Rudolf Kiszling concluded his biographical sketch:

Boroević certainly had something of a problematic nature. He was great in ability
and great in ambition. His life was rich in struggle and rich in successes in peace as well
as in war. The course of his life – before it was abruptly halted – moved to progressively
greater heights, but also led him across many gaps, but take all these together – here was
such a man!263
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CONCLUSION

There is a widely disseminated narrative associated with the collapse of the Habsburg
Monarchy during the final days of the First World War, one that involves the oppressed national
groups finally breaking free of rule from Vienna and Budapest, forging their own destiny. This is
the narrative of Tomas Masaryk and the Czechoslovak National Committee, of Ante Trumbić
and his colleagues on the Yugoslav Committee. In many ways, it is this narrative that has
predominated historiography of the region to the present day, as many contemporary historians
of the Balkans, such as Ivo Banac, emphasize the degree to which many South Slavs had given
up on the Dual Monarchy by the end of the war. 264
However, as the present study has illustrated, this narrative does not tell the whole story. Even
among the most vocal advocates for independence there could be found voices of compromise;
Masaryk himself did not entirely abandon the possibility of the Czechs remaining within a
restructured Monarchy until around 1914, just before the outbreak of the war. 265 As other studies
have noted, national affiliation was a much more fluid concept among the ethnic groups of the
Habsburg Monarchy even during the years immediately prior to the war, and the agenda
advanced by nationalist groups often found little resonance beyond the bourgeois
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intelligentsia.266 In this context, the most useful paradigm is that of Miroslav Hroch, who
postulated three stages of national development: Phase A (scholarly interest), Phase B (patriotic
agitation), and Phase C (a “mass national movement”). 267 By this paradigm, the South Slavs by
1918 were still within Phase B, and had not reached the stage where national feeling could be
stirred among most of the population.
From the benefit of hindsight, the inevitability of the triumph of nationalism and the demise
of the multinational state might appear obvious; however, this outcome was far from a foregone
conclusion, and it is not difficult to imagine a postwar settlement that would have preserved the
Habsburg Monarchy largely intact, as the Entente would have supported until very late in the
war. Even in the event, the national project was to prove a hard sell for many within the former
monarchy, especially to those, who were to be relegated to non-dominant roles within the
postwar states, such as the Slovaks or Slovenes. As events unfolded, neither Yugoslavia nor
Czechoslovakia truly fulfilled the national project; in both cases replicating some of the faults of
the previous Habsburg Monarchy. Within Yugoslavia one ethnic group dominated the rest; while
Czechoslovakia, in theory intended as an equal partnership, led to domination of Czech over
Slovak throughout its existence. In addition, the presence of national minorities (German,
Ukrainian, etc.) were a problem throughout Eastern Europe that none of the successor states to
the Monarchy were able to adequately deal with. It is small wonder that many in the South Slav
lands resisted pressure to “pick a side” or continued to feel loyalty to the monarch of the
Habsburg dynasty. While it may have been the case that many individual Serbs, Croats, Czechs,
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and others, welcomed the chance to develop their states outside the monarchy, Svetozar
Boroević was far from an outlier in maintaining both kaisertreu devotion and pride in his
Croatian heritage.
Indeed, subsequent developments in the South Slav lands as well as in Europe as a whole
have proven his point. While many South Slavs might have been indifferent to the national
program prior to 1918, nationalism and national identity came to be galvanized after 1918, in
support of, or in opposition to the Serbian-dominated “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes,”
ultimately to be renamed Yugoslavia. However, it was only with the events surrounding the
Second World War, and the actions of the Croatian fascist Ustase party and the reaction to these
atrocities pushed the South Slav peoples into Hroch’s Phase C of national development.
Although after 1945 Josip Broz Tito made considerable effort to subsume national tensions
under the banner of Communist “brotherhood and unity,” these efforts largely unraveled
following his death in 1980. During the 1980s and early 1990s nationalist leaders, including
Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, succeeded in mobilizing national sentiment, often by
invoking still-fresh memories of wartime national-inspired violence, and directed it at a program
of aggrandizement at the expense of the national “other.” This was to spell the end of the
Yugoslav experiment.268
Recent decades, however, have seen outcomes that might have left Svetozar Boroević at least
on some level gratified had he lived to witness them. Although the Yugoslav project failed, there
has been remarkable progress toward greater unity under the framework of the European Union.
Most of the former Habsburg Monarchy is currently part of the EU, including Slovenia and
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Croatia, and the other former Yugoslav states are in the process of becoming members. Already
the EU serves many of the economic functions that the Monarchy once did in Central Europe,
and in time, might encourage citizens to see themselves as part of a greater whole. Although
recent years have seen the rise of Euroskepticism and far-right movements that have attempted to
draw individual member states away from the EU (e.g., Brexit in the UK, the Freedom Party of
Austria, etc.), the EU has remained strong and will likely weather such crises.
Although there have been many bumps in the road, European states may now be arriving at
the point in history where there is no conflict between maintaining loyalty to one’s national unit
and adherence in a multinational federation. For proof of this sentiment, one might look no
further than the outcome of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, in which the electorate
decided that the economic benefits of remaining within the United Kingdom outweighed the
emotional appeal of the restoration of an independent Scottish state. 269
Finally, the border area where the Grenzer Field Marshal Boroević earned his greatest
acclaim now shows an encouraging sign of a future where it is no longer a border area at all.
Near Mount Kolovrat, along the current border between Italy and Slovenia in what was once the
Isonzo Front, recent years have seen the construction of the Kolovrat Outdoor Museum and the
Walk of Peace, a collaborative effort by both national governments to overcome their respective
national divisions and, in effect, make the current international border “invisible.” 270 Although
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one may view the prospects for the complete success of this goal with some skepticism, this is an
encouraging development given the complicated history of the region.
It is tempting to think that Svetozar Boroević might have found himself more at home had he
come of age in an earlier epoch of the history of the Habsburg Monarchy, say that of the
generation of his father, or of Jelacic and Radetzky, in which the national groups seeking to pull
away from the Monarchy were much more easily controlled. Boroević’s primary role, however,
was that of a soldier, and through that lens he was crafted for his wartime experience. Here he
fought valiantly to protect the Monarchy; first against Russian invasion, then from encroachment
on South Slav lands by Italian forces, and finally in a futile effort to preserve the Kaiser’s throne.
Austria-Hungary had other commanders in the field, some just as capable or even more so than
Boroević; Boroević should be remembered today not only for his military accomplishments but
above all for what he represents – the struggle, and choices, faced by many members of national
groups in the South Slav territories in those days of Autumn 1918.
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